_______________________________________________ ESCAPING THE MATRIX GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION: WHY WE NEED IT, AND HOW WE CAN GET IT © 2004 Richard K. Moore •••@••.••• http://cyberjournal.org draft version 2.2 This is a review draft of a copyrighted work. Please do not forward, except to selected individuals who may provide useful feedback. This draft does not include proper footnotes or references to the literature. I have inserted asterisks in (some of) those places where a footnote will be appropriate. Feedback is welcome on all aspects of the material, both substantive and presentational. _______________________________________________ Table Of Contents Chapter 1 A brief history of humanity Chapter 2 The matrix Chapter 3 We the People and the transformational imperative Chapter 4 The harmonization imperative Chapter 5 Achieving harmony and wisdom in groups Chapter 6 We the People and social transformation Chapter 7 Envisioning a democratic and sustainable world Chapter 8 The transition process Chapter 9 Living outside the matrix _______________________________________________ Chapter 1 A brief history of humanity * Natural evolution: competition within a cooperative web When I first learned in school about Darwin and evolution, the lesson could be summed up in the phrase, the survival of the fittest. The strong lion lived, and the weak lion died. The strong cave man got the nice cave and beautiful woman, and the weak cave man got the leftovers. With the strongest surviving and having the most offspring, the quality of species keep improving, and eventually the level of Homo sapiens was attained. I never thought to question this simplistic characterization of Darwin's ideas, because it seemed to make perfect sense. It turns out, however, that this just isn't how things work. For example, lions in a pride work together as a team, they share their food, and they look out for one another. When male lions compete for leadership of a pride, we see the simplistic dynamics of competition operating -- but that is only one part, an occasional episode, in the life of a lion pride. In fact, it is the cooperative and social nature of the pride which in part explains the success of the lion in comparison to other, less social, predator species. It was not until the latter part of the twentieth century that scientists began to study environments as a whole -- as ecosystems -- and to look at biology generally from a systems perspective. Once scientists looked at the real world, rather than just theorizing around the concept of competition, they found that nature is characterized much more by cooperation than by competition. Indeed, if we seek a simple phrase to characterize our new understanding -- to contrast with survival of the fittest -- it might be survival of those who fit in best. In the case of the lion pride we see an obvious example of cooperation -- conscious collaboration among sentient mammals -- whose emotions on making a kill are perhaps not that different than those of a soccer team on scoring a goal. But the principle of cooperation in nature goes much deeper, involving the relationship between plant and animal species within the context of their environment. It is not that a plant wants to cooperate -- that would be silly -- but it turns out that those species that fit in best -- within the overall system of exchange -- are the ones that have the best chance of surviving. If a predator species is too greedy for example, and kills off all its prey, then it won't survive. A colorful example of cooperation can be found in the case of a certain plant, which is pollinated only by a single species of insect, and that insect in turn can only survive if it has access to that plant. They are each other's life support system -- the two species have a mutually-beneficial symbiotic relationship. Another interesting example has to do with the relationship between deer and their predators. Predators always go for the weakest or slowest looking individual, and deer have evolved so as to depend on this in order to maintain the health of the herd. When deer are free of predators, as when they live in some kind of protected area, then the herd begins to deteriorate genetically within a few generations. An ecosystem is in some sense an invention of the observer. We can look at the whole Earth as one ecosystem or we can focus our attention on just a pond in a forest, or anywhere in between. But at whatever scale we might look, we find an interplay among species that can in many ways be compared to the economy of a community. In a community people do different jobs, some producing what others consume, and their collective exchanges are the economy of the community. We may only occasionally feel like we are "cooperating," as we go about our daily business, but every time we go into a shop, and find it open as usual, we are participating in a symbiotic relationship with the shopkeeper -- and both of us are cooperating in the larger endeavor of "keeping our community operating." Similarly, in an ecosystem, different species play different roles, some being consumed by others, and their collective 'exchanges' are the life-flow of the ecosystem. The ways in which cooperation occurs are not always so simple as that between a shopkeeper and customer. There can be a whole loop of exchanges, all of which together make up a symbiotic system. This is what we are referring to when we talk about the food chain. But it's not a chain with a top; mosquitoes, for example, feed on us. Richard Dawkins invites us to look at evolution at the level of the selfish gene. Most of us are more accustomed to thinking of evolution in terms of evolving species. Those are both useful perspectives, but what may actually be more illuminating is to think in terms of evolving ecosystems. In a rainforest, for example, there are thousands of species of plants, animals, birds and insects -- with countless and complex interconnecting relationships -- all of which add up to a vibrant, vital flow of life. Such a complex system evolves over many eons, each species co-evolving along with it, prey species getting faster, predator species getting more cunning, fruit species becoming more tasty to the seed-spreading creatures, etc. When we think in terms of species, the "goal" (i.e., tendency) of evolution seems clear: a species evolves toward being more successful, more able to catch its prey, more able to care for its young, etc. But what is the "goal" of ecosystem evolution? In what "direction" does an ecosystem tend, as it gets more refined and complex? There are perhaps different measuring rods which might be relevant to this question, but there is one that seems to be most fitting. The tendency of an ecosystem, assuming no drastic changes in environmental conditions, is toward maximizing the overall life activity within the system. As an ecosystem evolves over time, the amount of life activity going on per acre tends to increase, limited only by the life-support resources available. When plenty of sunshine, water, and fertile soil are available -- as in a rainforest -- then we see how far this evolutionary process is able to go. The amount of life in one acre of rainforest, from beneath the soil to the tops of the trees, is staggering. The rainforest can be seen as a pinnacle of ecosystem evolution. Similarly, in terms of the evolution of commerce, we might say the economy of New York City is a pinnacle. Both are examples of very complex systems, with all sorts of cooperative synergies and interconnections operating, all of which co-evolved over time. And just as a large city achieves a maximum in the quantity of monetary exchanges per acre, so a rainforest achieves a maximum in life activity per acre. As each system evolved, both cooperation and competition played a role. The big wheel of evolution is cooperation: the evolving web of mutually beneficial interactions, enabling ever greater productivity per acre. The smaller wheel of evolution is competition: where players compete to occupy the most desirable niches in the evolving system. The overall tendency in both cases is toward greater cooperative efficiency. Competition, in each case, plays a supplementary tuning role, rewarding favorable adaptations within the evolving system. * The nature of aboriginal societies Although life systems are pervaded by webs of cooperation, some species exhibit more overtly cooperative behavior than others. A Cheetah lives and hunts alone, sometimes supporting cubs; lions and dogs live and hunt in family groups. Among the most social and cooperative of the animal kingdom are the monkeys and apes. They are on the upper end of the animal intelligence scale; they can communicate relatively well with one another, and they use cooperation very effectively to achieve greater relative success -- as compared to other species that are less skilled at cooperation but perhaps physically stronger as individuals. The first humans, then, had been highly social and cooperative for millions of years prior to becoming distinctly human. We started out as cooperative bands, much like chimpanzee or baboon troops today. And as we began to find our own evolutionary path, we developed increased capacities for cooperation. Perhaps the most significant of these new capacities was that for complex language. As intelligence and linguistic capacity increased, enabling more complex languages to develop, early humans could plan out hunting expeditions, discuss strategy and compare experiences, talk over the pros and cons of migrating to a new territory, etc. Language, as an adaptive trait, can be seen as a tool designed to maximize the effectiveness and flexibility of cooperation within the band. We can perhaps now see how thoroughly wrong is the simplistic Darwinian characterization of evolution, as expressed in the common phrases, survival of the fittest, or law of the jungle. A jungle, in fact, is much the same as a rain forest -- a pinnacle of cooperative synergy. Darwin himself had a more insightful view about cooperation, even back in the 1800s, than that expressed by the simplistic interpretations.* Based on archeological evidence, in particular skeletal and DNA remains, it seems that we have been fully human for something like 150,000 years, although as usual, experts differ over the precise dating*. In any case, people have been just like us for a very, very long time -- before any kind of civilization came along. If a human infant could be brought across time from that far back, and be adopted into a modern family, he or she would grow up speaking today's language and be in every way a typical modern person. We can be sure there have been many individuals -- throughout the span of this whole period -- with the capacity for genius of a Mozart or Einstein. The archeological evidence conclusively indicates that for almost all of these 150,000 years -- excepting only about the past 10,000 -- we have lived in small, hunter-gatherer bands. But archeology can give us very little detail about what our societies were like back in the early days. In order to gain insight into what those societies must have been like, we need to look elsewhere. History is no help, because no language was recorded until the old hunter-gatherer ways were already giving over to the ways of civilization -- and it was the new ways that were recorded. We can learn a lot, however, by looking at those hundreds or perhaps thousands of indigenous societies that have been observed and studied over the past few centuries as Europeans expanded their operations to previously uncivilized areas. Anthropologists have surveyed the many such societies that have been studied and written about by witnesses, and they have gone out and studied still-existing societies in the field directly, They have found an amazing diversity and variety of languages, cultures, systems of beliefs, diets, and economic lifestyles. They have also found certain characteristics, in addition to being based on hunter-gathering, that seem to apply to all aboriginal societies -- up to the point where they make contact with civilization. Given that people have been basically the same for 150,000 years (in terms of their innate capacities and tendencies), given that all known aboriginal societies share certain characteristics, and given that the "sample size" of known such societies is a very large one -- given these three things we can reasonably assume that for nearly all of the past 150,000 years all humans have lived in societies with these same characteristics. And we do find quite a number of universally shared characteristics in observed aboriginal societies. Every such society has a complex language, capable of abstract and imaginative expression. Every such society has its own culture, supported by mythologies, beliefs, taboos, and stories which are passed down orally from generation to generation. In this way mores, history, discovered knowledge, and adaptive behaviors are preserved and reinforced in the culture. Frequently poetic, rhythmic, and musical forms are employed--which aid greatly in preserving intact the oral cultural heritage through the generations. Typically there is a creation story in which some kind of spirits or gods lay down the foundation of the cultural beliefs and explain the society's place in the world. Every such society, except those going through some kind of adaptive transitional phase, lives sustainably in its environment. Although the observed mythologies are very diverse, they all place humanity within the context of nature, as part of nature, with a kind of spiritual responsibility to live in harmony with nature. The members of every such society cooperate systematically in their economic endeavors -- mostly hunting, foraging, and territorial defense -- with culturally specified roles for different ages and sexes. Every such society is egalitarian, apart from gender and age differentiation, and decisions tend to be made by consensus based on open dialog -- with no individual or clique being given the power to decide for the group. There may be chiefs, selected for their wisdom and knowledge, but they hunt and gather along with everyone else, and they have no authority to command others. Such societies exhibit territorial behavior, each group typically wandering over a particular area, following the diet opportunities as the seasons change and local areas become depleted. Although communication and exchange occur among neighboring groups, territories are defended against intruders and a pattern of relatively stable territorial niches is generally maintained. These patterns shift from time to time, as changing conditions cause some groups to migrate -- and more aggressive groups sometimes displace other groups -- but on a day-to-day basis each group has its own territory, within which it finds its collective livelihood. * Cultural evolution: stability within adaptability Animals are born with most of their behavior patterns already hard-wired in. Humans, on the other hand, learn their behavior patterns -- and their culture generally -- as they grow up their society. Just as a fox or lion inherits instincts that make them efficient hunters, instincts that evolved over the eons, so aboriginals inherit a culture that enables them to efficiently use their territory, a culture that has evolved over many generations. An aboriginal culture is finely tuned to its own local environment -- as finely tuned as are the instincts of an animal to the requirements of its evolved niche. But whereas animal behaviors change only on a time scale of millions of years or more, human cultures can evolve over thousands or even hundreds of years. When a group migrates to a new kind of territory, for example, it can typically learn all the useful plants, and the patterns of the local animals, within a single century.* This ability to rapidly adapt to new circumstance enabled early human societies to spread out from their original primate habitats and occupy a wide variety of niches. We soon left the other species behind like so many frozen statues in a pastoral tableau. Lions are still doing exactly what they were doing before humans came along. Meanwhile, humans spread out over whole continents, from tropical deserts to the polar regions, evolving specialized cultures suitable to each kind of environment that was encountered. The loss of innate specialization, as a biologically inherited characteristic, represents one of the most significant genetic distinctions between humans and other species -- ranking right up there with complex linguistic capacity. On the one hand, de-specialization enabled us to inhabit nearly the whole globe, aided by our ability to discuss and share our discoveries and experiences. On the other hand, it has made us particularly dependent on our societies for our survival. Whereas a mixed group of lions from different prides could be released into an available territory -- and they might be expected to form successful new prides -- a mixed group of humans from different aboriginal groups would find it very difficult to develop an effective cultural response to the new environment -- even if they could communicate in some common language, which typically wouldn't be the case. Although from a long-range perspective cultural evolution is characterized by its adaptability, aboriginal cultures tend to exhibit remarkable stability over very long periods -- when environmental conditions don't change much and there are no significant intrusions by other societies. Cultural stability is a desirable survival trait: it serves to preserve the adaptive knowledge the group has gained over the generations. This cultural stability is facilitated by the fact that children are highly impressionable. If an aboriginal child, or a modern child for that matter, is told by a trusted adult that a certain mountain is the home of a certain god, with a certain agenda, the child will typically take that on board as absolute, literal truth. The child learns its culture not as a set of facts to remember; rather the culture is absorbed as the child's model of reality: what the world is all about, what the role of society is in the world, and how people are supposed to behave. The more this model is reinforced through social interactions, the more deeply embedded it becomes n the child's mind. When the child becomes an adult, he or she simply "knows" that the cultural beliefs are "the truth." The adult would no more question these beliefs than a devout Christian would question the existence of God. As a consequence, the adults of an aboriginal society tend to pass on their culture to their children exactly as they themselves learned it. As children, they were too impressionable to question the culture, and as adults they don't question it because they "know it's true." In addition, coherent stories, poems, images and songs provide a reliable mechanism for passing on cultural details unchanged. Hence aboriginal cultures tend to remain remarkably stable until new adaptations are required, or new opportunities arise, due to some significant change in circumstances. * Origins of civilization: inside and outside the Garden For nearly all of the past 150,000 years, bar only about the past 10,000, all of us humans lived in aboriginal societies like the ones described above; we inherited our cultures socially, and we passed them on much as we found them, believing them to be "truth." What happened about 10,000 years ago is that some societies began to systematically domesticate plants and animals as a means of food production. This shift from hunter-gathering, and its aftermath, are knows as the agricultural revolution. The consequences of this revolution were profound, bringing about fundamental changes in the economies and social structures of societies, and leading eventually to the development of civilizations. There were significant variations in the nature of this revolution in different societies. Economically, societies went down a number of paths, ranging from nomadic herding to settled agricultural villages, and combinations of those along with residual hunter-gathering. Rather than opportunistically harvesting what nature naturally produces, societies were now beginning to manage the production process themselves. It is much more efficient to raise a sty full of pigs than it is to go out hunting boar. A given number of people engaged in animal husbandry and farming can generate more food for the group than can the same number of hunter-gatherers. Thus, the agricultural revolution gave societies access to a significantly increased food supply. This led, as you might expect, to larger families -- and hence the population of societies increased -- for the first time ever in our history as a species. In a hunter-gatherer society some hunt and some gather. That's about it, except for perhaps a few specialists, such as healers, or ornament makers. In a society which manages its own food production, on the other hand, there is both a need and an opportunity for a greater number of social roles, and an increased emphasis on specialization. There are many jobs to do, including gathering and storing seeds, plowing (when it was eventually invented), planting, tending fields, fending off pest species, harvesting, preparing food for storage, maintaining storage facilities, fashioning storage containers and farm implements, foraging for materials from which to fashion implements, etc. etc. Bands became villages. These had many more members than bands ever had, and the people had more varied and specialized roles. The aboriginal political form -- egalitarian dialog and consensus -- became increasingly unstable as a governing principle. In a hunter-gatherer society, egalitarianism is simply the reality of how life is lived. Everyone must work equally, doing more or less the same things, or they don't eat. In such a society it is only natural that community discussions be approached on an egalitarian basis. What other basis could there be? But in a society with a variety of roles, the realities of everyday life may no longer be so egalitarian. Perhaps some roles are seen as being "higher" than others, or perhaps some people find ways to accumulate wealth at the expense of others, or somehow get others to till the fields while they drink the wine. In any case, the fact is that the agricultural revolution did create a crisis of governance for humanity. In a political sense, we had lived in the Garden of Eden for something like 140,000 years. We were all equal; we all had a say; we were free, intelligent, sovereign human beings -- within a supportive and cooperative community. Now all of a sudden, there were too many of us for this to keep working in the same way. And there were too many loose cannons, in terms of economic dynamics, for societies to remain stable on their aboriginal terms. In addition, the agricultural revolution was necessarily accompanied by a transformation in cultures and mythologies. People were doing new things, societies were doing new things -- tuned somewhat differently to the seasonal cycles -- and new stories were needed to explain what it's all about, and what is expected of people. Thus at the level of the individual society -- the overgrown hunter-gatherer band -- agriculture led to a destabilization of long-established social forms. The growing complexity of society would require a new equilibrium to be reached in terms of social relationships, a requirement never before faced by humanity. At the same time, agriculture led to a destabilization at a higher level -- at the level of the larger system of societies. For 140,000 years and before, the system was very simple: each band had its own territory; it was self-sufficient, and interactions between bands were, for the most part, economically negligible. The relationship between societies in the aboriginal world amounted to a flat space of autonomous, relatively non-interacting units. With agriculture and herding, new economic dynamics were unleashed. Trade became possible. Herders, for example, could make butter and cheese from the herd's milk, and trade it for grain from farmers. Trade routes developed, and villages near crossroads could develop into trading centers. There was now a structure to the relationship between societies. I will no longer be able to use the words band, community, and society interchangeably. There is now a larger society, with structure on a larger scale. With all of these new forces in play, and long-established social forms failing, there was a need for new forms to emerge, new equilibriums to be reached. Until recently, the common historical belief was that there was only one line of equilibrium that was followed: that of male-domination, hierarchy, conquest and empire, and so on with the standard "history of civilization" -- beginning in the fertile crescent, and then on to Egypt, Greece, etc. But more recent research, as eloquently reported by Riane Eisler in the Chalice and the Blade, reveals that there was another path of equilibrium that was followed by some societies, a path which led to a civilization of a different kind. These societies too found ways to deal with complexity, and increased interaction among social units -- but they came at it from a different angle. They managed to retain more of the desirable aspects from their aboriginal cultural heritage. Many of these societies were located in southeastern Europe, leading to a new archeological term, the Civilization of Old Europe. Eisler characterizes the first type as dominator societies, and the Old Europe type as partnership societies. Dominator societies tend to worship authoritarian male gods; they relegate females to secondary roles; they are based on ranking and hierarchy; they engage relatively frequently in warfare; they believe in the what Daniel Quinn calls the taker myth, which Genesis expresses as "Go forth and conquer the beasts of the fieldŠ" The images left behind on pottery and other artifacts frequently depict scenes of battle, with glorious heroes, slain enemies, and captured slaves. Excavations reveal that settlements were typically fortified, and many were destroyed and rebuilt time and time again, by new generations of conquerors. Partnership societies, on the other hand, worship a beneficent goddess, give equal roles to men and women, are relatively egalitarian in their structure, are generally peaceful, and their mythology is oriented around partnership with nature, rather than domination of nature.. The images left behind show many aspects of their lives, but there are no depictions of battles, warrior heroes, or slavery. Settlements were not fortified, and many of the sites that have been excavated show that they remained undisturbed by warfare for spans of over 1500 years*[Eisler 13] These Old Europe societies were highly developed, with technologies and administrative systems on a par with, or ahead of, the dominator societies of the same period. Their art was highly developed, the palace at Knossos (preserved c. 1500 BC by earthquake) being perhaps the most striking example. The king and queen of this Minoan society had chambers of equal stature, the people in the frescoes all seem lively and joyful, and the festivals and rituals involve both sexes equally, including games involving physical strength and agility. The (well-rendered) people in the frescos typically appear very much like equals at a party, with no one on a throne, and no retinue of servants in evidence. The palace looks down on a vista from a modest coastal hill, is not fortified, nor is there any evidence of fortifications along any approaches. It was clearly constructed on the assumption that it was not likely to be attacked. One of the frescos in the Queen's Chamber, a brilliantly colored underwater scene involving dolphins, is one of the most elegantly composed frescos I've seen from any era; there is nothing at all "primitive" about its style; it is strikingly contemporary. The Palace itself is an immense architectural masterpiece, far more modern looking than the much later edifices of the classical Greek and Roman periods. One side of the structure drifts down the slope of the hill, blending Frank Lloyd Wright-style with its environment. The interior spaces are flowing, dynamic, asymmetric, inviting, with many levels -- and amazing uses of natural light and water courses. The familiar terra-cotta clay drain pipes looked they could have been laid in recently, and the Queen even had a flush toilet. I quote here from Eisler, p. 13: Between circa 7000 and 3500 B.C.E. these early Europeans developed a complex social organization involving craft specialization. They created complex religious and governmental institutions. They used metals such as copper and gold for ornaments and tools. They even evolved what appears to be a rudimentary script. In Gimbuta's words "If one defines civilization as the ability of a given people to adjust to its environment and to develop adequate arts, technology, script, and social relationships it is evident that Old Europe achieved a marked degree of success." This partnership path to civilization was not a maladaptive cul-de-sac that didn't work out. It came to an end only because of invasion by warrior-based dominator societies, who plundered and who also borrowed technologies. Whereas archeologists long believed that agriculture first originated in the contest of a dominator Sumerian society, the latest evidence reveals much earlier agriculture-based partnership settlements in the region, indicating that the later Sumerian society did not originate the technology but borrowed it, most likely after conquering the more pacific inventors. There is no way to know how civilization would have developed, if this partnership path had been allowed to survive. But based on how far it was able to progress, in the limited time available to it, it seems at least plausible to imagine that the partnership forms might have been able to incorporate advancing technologies, and move toward what we might recognize as "modernity," while retaining a relatively egalitarian and generally peaceful. culture This possibility is at least plausible enough that it would be worth our while to try to extrapolate how such a society might have evolved, as it incorporated increasingly complex and empowering technologies. When they had more power, energy, and artifacts available to them, in whatever forms that might have manifested, could such societies have avoided drifting into some kind of competitive warfare, perhaps over the resources required to support new technologies? We will return to these questions in a later chapter, but we will approach them from a slightly different perspective. For now there are two conclusions that I would like to draw, before moving on to the next chapter. First conclusion: Contrary to previous scientific understanding, early, complex, agriculture-based societies were not universally associated with hierarchy, female subservience, and an attitude of domination toward nature. We can no longer assume, carte blanche, that hierarchy and dominance are necessary in order to manage increasingly complex societies. We must now be somewhat in doubt about this question. We must at least admit that a viable candidate exists for an alternate organizing paradigm, and that we cannot be sure how far that partnership model might be capable of developing without losing its core virtues. Second conclusion: A partnership culture cannot remain viable -- not in the long run -- if it must face competition from dominator cultures. A dominator society, in competition with others, learns to focus its available resources in a concentrated strategic attack during warfare. In order for a partnership culture to keep up some kind of defensive arms race in the face of aggressive societies, it would need to become like them -- regimented and focused via hierarchical command and control. If there was a viable long-term future for the partnership model to reach maturity as a modern society, that viable future would have led to an entire globe based on partnership. The world isn't big for both models to co-exist; they are like parchment and acid. The pursuit of the dominator path began, symbolically speaking, when Adam left the Garden. That path was thenceforth destined to prevail, not by divine intervention, nor by any lack of adaptive ability to on partnership's part -- but by the natural dynamics that occur between the armed and the unarmed, the takers and the producers. Could we have planted more partnership Gardens, rather than leaving home to find our fortunes as conquerors of nature and of weaker tribes? Is there any sense in which it might be possible for us to return to the Garden? Can the prodigal son, which is civilization, somehow return home to experience once again a fatted calf and family hearth, and emerge with a recovered vision, the "lost chord" of harmonious social organization? Might that even be the message intended in the parable of the prodigal?Šas told by that one who did not come to fulfill the lawŠthat one who spoke of the brotherhood of man and of the meek inheriting the Earth. Could such a revolutionary and very earthly message -- anathema alike to Rome, the Pharisees, and the emerging Christian hierarchy -- be the actual ultimate secret that lies beneath the legend and partial history that form the basis of the story told in Dan Brown's novel, The Da Vinci Code? Was that one, among other things, a social revolutionary -- seeking to assure us of the possibility of salvation on Earth through our own efforts, by waking up to the "kingdom that lies within"? * The co-evolution of conditioning and hierarchy Anthropologists tell us that the first hierarchical societies were chiefdoms. These chiefs, however, were not at all like the chiefs that occur in aboriginal societies. While those chiefs are chosen based on their ability to provide wise advice and guidance, these dominator chiefs ruled with absolute authority -- with defiance punishable by death. The role of such a chief became economically feasible once a society reached the point where it was able to accumulate significant stored foodstuffs. Once there were granaries, or wine cellars, or salt-meat sheds -- holding the critically needed winter's food supply -- then the opportunity existed for an aggressive and charismatic would-be boss to assemble allies, seize the storehouses, and establish a hierarchical chiefdom -- with perhaps his coup allies as lieutenants administering food allocation. Or perhaps a more subtle transition: someone volunteers to store the village's grain in their extra hut, as a public service. His son inherits the role, but begins to see it as a right, and gets bossy about who gets how much food, etc. ad escalatum. By one happenstance or another, many societies did end up as chiefdoms, and by doing so they took the first steps down the relentless dominator path. Thus Adam banished himself from the Garden time and time again, in different parts of the world. But in some societies, and whole regions, partnership-based agricultural societies persisted for several thousand years, with sizable granaries, and they remained somehow immune to hierarchical coups until the very end -- when overwhelming invasions swept in from dominator societies. What defense mechanisms -- cultural immune system -- did these societies possess which protected them so reliably from internal power usurpation for so long? Again, we will return to this thread later, but will approach it from a slightly different context. For now, I'd like to trace a particular thread through the evolution that occurred within and among the dominator societies -- in the world outside the Garden. We are all familiar with the standard story of civilization, where chiefdoms grow to kingdoms, historical events begin to have names and dates attached, mighty empires appear, as in Egypt -- hierarchies getting always larger in scale and rulers grander -- until finally one dominator superpower has very nearly achieved global hegemony, and its leaders are greeted with reverence (by officialdom at least) wherever in the world they deign to pay a visit. Within this so-called "rise of civilization" story, let us trace the role and basis of social conditioning. Earlier in our discussion, we noted that by the time we were fully human, we had acquired certain genetic traits that enabled us to adapt to new niches, and which at the same time facilitated cultural stability. One of those traits -- de-specialization -- is an important distinguishing characteristic of humanity, as compared to the other primates and "higher" mammals. In the context of the aboriginal world, de-specialization represented cultural flexibility -- the ability of a society, over to time, to co-create a culture more suitable to a change in conditions. The other related trait -- the impressionability of youth -- is not uniquely human. But in conjunction with de-specialization, it means that a human child has the capacity to take on board -- within broad limits -- almost any arbitrary cultural pattern, and will then as an adult accept that pattern as "the obvious truth" about how things are and how things need to be. In the context of the aboriginal world, these two traits together enabled cultural readjustment when appropriate, and reliably preserved adaptive behaviors the rest of the time. Let us now consider the consequences of these biological traits in the context of a dominator society. We can see the main structure of those consequences in the very first chiefdoms, the very first steps toward hierarchical civilizations. Typically these early chiefs claimed to be gods -- and were treated as such by their subjects. The children of the tribe were taught that the chief was a god, they took it as truth, and as adults their obedience was assured. Chiefs could use force to command allegiance, but their need to use force was greatly reduced by their status as divinities. To disobey or oppose the chief was not only a crime punishable by death, but a sacrilege as well. As long as each new generation was conditioned to this system of myths, then the chief and his heirs were able to maintain their ruling positions with minimum need for force. Even the natural necessity of slavery could be conditioned into slave children, rendering them mostly docile in adulthood, and showing how powerful indeed is the tool of appropriate conditioning, in getting people to accept almost any social conditions. From the very beginning of hierarchical societies, myths and conditioning have been used to subjugate, exploiting human traits that had evolved much earlier for different purposes. As civilization has evolved, the means of conditioning the masses have become gradually more sophisticated. Hammurabi was apparently the first Western ruler to reduce the cultural rules to an enumerated list, a list that was consciously designed by a known elite ruler. With Constantine we see an emperor facing a crisis of control; we see him select a religion to use as a conditioning tool; we see him modify the principles and censor the defining documents of that religion (Nicene Council, 325AD); we see him declare the newly customized religion to be the official mythology of the empire -- and then we see the new regime succeed in resolving Constantine's crisis of control.* In the Western world at least, Constantine's formula continued as a primary control strategy right up until the period of the Enlightenment, when a new primary mythology began to spread, expressing itself in republican movements and revolutions. During the intervening millennia, a partnership between the sibling hierarchies of church and throne -- Constantine's formula-remained the mainstay foundation of Western dominator forms. When changing conditions pushed monarchs toward stronger nationalism, then protestant revolutions were encouraged, shifting the church part of the hierarchy closer to home -- reducing its relative power vis a vis the throne -- while not reducing its power to control the masses through conditioning. Indeed the pulpits now had the printing press; the masses could learn to read and could then condition themselves on their own time -- a very effective technological adaptation on the part of elites. When republics were established, a radically different mythological regime accompanied them, one consciously promulgated by emerging new elites. Whereas the previous regimes had aimed to condition populations to accept the reality of their oppression -- i.e., their station in life -- the new regime proclaimed the doctrine that people can escape altogether from arbitrary rule by elites -- a doctrine which may prove, someday, to be true. But along with this perhaps-valid doctrine came a whopper of a myth: the myth told people that they had already rid themselves of elite rule, that they themselves were now the sovereign rulers of society. The schools taught, and the people came to believe, that they lived already in democracies. The strength of this conditioning can be measured by the number of readers who, at this early stage in our narrative, are asking themselves, "Hold on a minute, isn't it true that we do live in democracies?" I would not expect anyone to burst free of that deeply embedded and daily-reinforced myth on the basis of the general observations I have offered in this context-establishing chapter. In later chapters we will examine, as an archetypal case, America's Founding Fathers, and the circumstances and intentions surrounding the drafting and adoption of the widely revered American Constitution. After that inspection, and the intervening material, you may find yourself more willing to entertain doubt regarding the "obvious truth" of democracy-achieved. Let us now slow down the pace of our whirlwind flight over human history, and focus in the next chapter on a brief era, the era that began in 1945 AD. The conditioning thread will continue to play heavily in our narrative. Indeed, the metaphor of the matrix, based on the film, is introduced to symbolize the complex illusion that characterizes the mainstream belief systems of modern capitalist societies. _______________________________________________ -- ============================================================ If you find this material useful, you might want to check out our website (http://cyberjournal.org) or try out our low-traffic, moderated email list by sending a message to: •••@••.••• You are encouraged to forward any material from the lists or the website, provided it is for non-commercial use and you include the source and this disclaimer. Richard Moore (rkm) Wexford, Ireland "Escaping The Matrix - Global Transformation: WHY WE NEED IT, AND HOW WE CAN ACHIEVE IT ", current draft: http://www.ratical.org/co-globalize/rkmGlblTrans.html _____________________________ "...the Patriot Act followed 9-11 as smoothly as the suspension of the Weimar constitution followed the Reichstag fire." - Srdja Trifkovic There is not a problem with the system. The system is the problem. Faith in ourselves - not gods, ideologies, leaders, or programs. _____________________________ "Zen of Global Transformation" home page: http://www.QuayLargo.com/Transformation/ QuayLargo discussion forum: http://www.QuayLargo.com/Transformation/ShowChat/?ScreenName=ShowThreads cj list archives: http://cyberjournal.org/cj/show_archives/?lists=cj newslog list archives: http://cyberjournal.org/cj/show_archives/?lists=newslog _____________________________ Informative links: http://www.indymedia.org/ http://www.globalresearch.ca/ http://www.MiddleEast.org http://www.rachel.org http://www.truthout.org http://www.williambowles.info/monthly_index/ http://www.zmag.org http://www.co-intelligence.org ============================================================
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