cj#254> re: Bush, Thatcher & Gulf Adventure


Richard Moore

> Sender: LECLERC YVES <•••@••.•••>
> Just one small point: About Saddam's being drawn into a trap, you mustn't
> forget Margaret Thatcher's role in this. She is almost certainly the one
> who convinced Bush to take the hard line...
> So I'm not sure there was a "trap Saddam" plot... more likely opportunists
> taking advantage of the occasion after the fact. The plot came later, with
> the manoeuvres to draw some Arab countries and most of Europe into the
> U.S.-British alliance, through various threats and promises (e.g. the U.N.
> leadership to an Egyptian, and the menace of taking away France's
> permanent seat at the Security Council to give it to Germany).

This analysis ignores the fact that the U.S. State Department responded
with a "go-ahead" signal to Saddam, _prior_ to the invasion.  Such signals
are common, and typically the U.S. stands behind them (albeit covertly), as
we've seen with Israel's invasion of Lebanon, Turkey's invasion of Iraq,
and most recently with Croatia's invasion of Krajina.  The signal was
undoubtedly central to Iraq's decision to invade.

Contrary to the circus hearings later -- when the State Department tried to
claim it "didn't think Saddam was serious" -- the U.S. had very good
intelligence on Iraq & Saddam.  The signal was not a slip up.

White House rhetoric at the time of such signals must be seen as PR, and
not confused with the political transaction being undertaken.  When Israel
invaded Lebanon, there were screeches of protest from the White House
(necessary to mollify Arab "allies"), but the U.S. fleet nonetheless
carried out its mission of pinning Russia and Syria, and Israel suffered no
serious sanctions by the U.S.  Actions speak louder than words.

So when Iraq invaded Kuwait, I think it is clear that it was a set up.  The
interpretation of the plan behind the set up is not so straightforward, and
that's why the NWO article is as long as it is.

As an American observing U.S. foreign policy, I perceived the sequence of
U.S. neo-blitzkrieg endeavors -- Grenada, Panama, Iraq -- as a clear
pattern.  Each was a bigger version of the previous, extending the mission
in some clear way.  They were Reagan-Bush's answer to the "Vietnam
Syndrome" -- how to get the U.S. back into gunboat diplomacy without
stirring up an anti-war movement.

Grenada had the null-journalism and blitzkrieg-speed, but was a miniscule
operation, almost a laboratory experiment.  Panama scaled up to an
operational field test, and expanded the propaganda extravaganza, but
stayed within the traditional scope of unilateral, Monroe-Doctrine

In the case of the Gulf "War", the new element was mainly the
internationalization itself.  The propaganda and operation were simply a
scale-up from Panama.  The emphasis on U.N. approval, enlistment of allies,
and the attempt to get reimbursements from Japan and Germany -- these were
new, and these were directly related to Bush's use of the term "New World

The U.S. could not have succeeded in this internationalization campaign if
it came out and said: "I tricked Saddam into invading, and now I'm going to
kick his ass!"  So Bush had to act shocked by the invasion of Kuwait, and
begin recruiting support.  If George managed to give Margaret the
impression she came up with the idea of invading Iraq, that would have been
first-rate promotional behavior.  More likely, that was a spin that helped
them both: it let Margaret look like a world-shaker; it helped Bush
camoflage the U.S. scheme; it began a familiar coalition-building pattern.

 Posted by Richard K. Moore (•••@••.•••) Wexford, Ireland (USA citizen)
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