Richard Heinberg: Middle East at a Crossroads


Richard Moore

From: <•••@••.•••>
Subject: MuseLetter for August
Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 10:10:56 -0700

MuseLetter 172 / August 2006


At the fifth annual conference of ASPO (the Association for the Study 
of Peak Oil), held in July in Pisa, Italy, there were many excellent 
presentations, one of which I will report on at some length below.

But the timing of the conference proved ominous. During two weeks of 
travel in Italy I had only occasional access to the Internet or to 
other news sources, and heard only sporadic reports on the unfolding 
crisis in Israel, Gaza, and Lebanon. Back home, I quickly caught up 
on the events.

The situation clearly requires comment, as it has enormous 
implications both for the world as a whole and for the small but 
growing community of people involved in preparations for Peak Oil. 
Mainstream reporting seems to miss much of the context of events and, 
when discussing the Middle East, the geopolitical struggle for 
control of energy resources nearly always forms much of that context.

Israel / Palestine / Hebzollah / Lebanon

It seems useful to start by recounting a timeline of the crisis, but 
that's not as easy as it sounds. Where does one start? What incidents 
should be mentioned or not mentioned? The following is my best 
effort, but may strike some as incomplete or skewed.

In elections held last year, the Palestinian people voted in a Hamas 
government, which came to power in January. Israel and the US 
responded by refusing to recognize the new government's legitimacy; 
since then, there has been a steady escalation of tensions between 
Israel and the Palestinian authority.

On June 24 Israeli soldiers kidnapped a Palestinian doctor and his 
brother in Gaza and removed them to some unspecified detention 
facility. This would not be a particularly noteworthy event, except 
for the fact that on the following day militants in Gaza-perhaps in 
retaliation-kidnapped an Israeli soldier.

Israel responded with dramatically intensified attacks on Gaza. Then, 
on July 12, Hezbollah-a political and military Shia Muslim 
organization based in Lebanon-captured two Israeli soldiers and 
killed six others. According to the official Israeli version of the 
story, this occurred during a cross-border raid by Hezbollah into 
northern Israel.

However, early press accounts said that Israel had sent a commando 
force into southern Lebanon; these commandoes, operating near the 
village of Aitaa al-Chaab inside Lebanon's southern territory, were 
then allegedly engaged by Hezbollah fighters, who struck an Israeli 

In either case, over the next days and weeks Hezbollah fired hundreds 
of rockets into Israel, killing dozens and wounding many more, while 
Israel bombed southern Lebanon, using (according to some reports) 
chemical weapons and cluster bombs, killing hundreds and destroying 
roads, bridges, power stations, and other civilian infrastructure.

US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice traveled to Lebanon on July 23, 
but not to broker a ceasefire; instead she called a ceasefire 
"premature." In Washington she had said that Israel should ignore 
calls for a ceasefire; en route to Beirut she honed the message: 
while there was an "urgent" need for peace, conditions had to be 
right. In Beirut Rice explained that those "right" conditions 
consisted essentially of the satisfaction of Israel's goals in the 
conflict; she also called for the creation of "a new Middle East"-a 
phrase that can inspire little hope or comfort in the inhabitants of 
the region, given what the US has accomplished in Iraq during the 
past three years. While no one would say so, it was obvious to nearly 
everyone that the US was refusing to call for a ceasefire to give 
Israel time to conclude its operations.

On July 26, Israel bombed a UN observer post in Lebanon, killing 
four. Then, on July 30, Israeli bombs killed 54 civilians (mostly 
women and children) in Qana, raising such international outrage that 
Israel felt compelled to suspended most of its bombing campaign for 
48 hours.

As of this writing, Rice is proposing a ceasefire to be implemented 
on condition of the banning of arms sales to Hezbollah, the moving of 
the Lebanese army to the southern region, and the creation of an 
international force as a backup. There is no mention, in this 
proposal for a "lasting" peace, of an Israeli pullback from Gaza or 
the release of hundreds of Lebanese prisoners. Meanwhile, Israel has 
commenced a large-scale ground offensive that seems likely to 
continue for at least a couple of weeks.

This is more or less what we know-given the differences in the 
versions being rehearsed by news outlets and government officials. 
But there is much that is even less clear: Why is this happening now? 
What are the motives of Israel, Hezbollah, and the US? And in what 
direction are the events headed? Hezbollah's initial motive seems 
principally to have been to gain a couple of Israeli hostages to use 
as bargaining chips in exchange for Lebanese, Palestinian, and 
Hezbollah prisoners held in Israel. Hezbollah's leader, Sheik Hussein 
Nasrallah, made it perfectly clear months prior to the commencement 
of the current hostilities that this was the plan. Secondarily, 
Hezbollah wishes to support the embattled Palestinians in Gaza. There 
are those who have suggested that Hezbollah was acting at the behest 
of Iran in order to deflect international attention from that 
nation's nuclear research program (more on that below), but this 
suggestion seems far-fetched.

It would be a mistake to probe only Hezbollah's motives in the 
conflict while assuming (as most American politicians and news 
outlets do) that Israel is merely responding self-defensively to a 
situation imposed upon it.

First, there is the legitimate question as to whether Israel provoked 
the conflict through its own cross-border incursion; then there is an 
article published in the San Francisco Chronicle on July 21 ("Israel 
Set War Plan More than a Year Ago," by Matthew Kalman), detailing how 
Israel's campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon was in fact planned 
months in advance, merely requiring a proximate trigger. If this is 
the case, then it is Israel's motives that we should probe first and 
foremost. According to leftist international affairs commentator Pepe 
Escobar, in "The Spirit of Resistance" (Asia Times, July 26,, As far as 
Lebanon is concerned, Israel wants nothing less than a permanent 
buffer zone on its northern flank. And if Lebanon turns into an Iraq, 
even better-although the Lebanese have learned the hard way about 
sectarianism and won't "Iraqify" their own country. Beirut will be 
rebuilt-again, and again the Hariri clan (with its dodgy deals with 
the US and the Saudis) will plunge Lebanon in further debt purgatory 
with regard to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as 
the clan did in the previous reconstruction process. There's also the 
all-important matter of the waters of the Litani River in southern 
Lebanon. Israel might as well prepare the terrain now for the 
eventual annexation of the Litani. Beyond Lebanon, Israel is mostly 
interested also in Syria. The motive: the all-important pipeline 
route from Kirkuk, in Iraqi Kurdistan, to Haifa. Enter Israel as a 
major player in Pipelineistan. So Israel wants to grab water (and 
territory) from Palestine, water (and territory) from Lebanon, and 
oil from Iraq. This all has to do with the inevitable-the 
21st-century energy wars.

While the US is not a direct participant in the conflict, its own 
aims cannot be ignored. These, according to Escobar, include "cutting 
off Hezbollah from Lebanese society," which would in turn "lead to a 
vulnerable Syria extricating itself from a close relationship with 
Iran." In the short term, the United States would like Israel to wipe 
out Hezbollah, allow the Lebanese government to send its troops to 
the south of the country, ensure the safety of northern Israel, cut 
Syria's influence down to size, and apply greater pressure on 
Hezbollah-supporting Iran. In the longer term, Washington apparently 
wants to redraw the political and ideological map of the Middle East 
in ways set forth in various neoconservative planning documents, 
regardless of the cost to locals.

Currently, between Israel and Hezbollah, it is unclear whose goals 
are being accomplished more fully-although on balance it would seem 
that Hezbollah has had the upper hand so far (this view appears to 
hold across the international political spectrum). Israel's 
devastating attacks seem not to have turned Lebanese society against 
the militant organization; moreover, Hezbollah's Viet Cong-style 
guerilla campaign appears to be succeeding, as merely to survive the 
sustained Israeli atttack can be counted a victory. As Israel's 
ground assault continues, that assessment could change.

But what are the longer-term implications? Where is all of this 
headed? It may be impossible to assess the situation merely by 
reference to the current combatants; we must take into account the 
other trends in the region and how this conflict may play into them.

Iran:  Will the US Attack Before November?

At the ASPO conference a riveting presentation was delivered by 
Terence Ward, a writer (Searching for Hassan) who grew up in Iran and 
is currently a cross-cultural consultant for businesses, foundations, 
and governments in the Islamic World and the West. Ward believes that 
a US bombing attack on Tehran is nearly inevitable (a view that I put 
forward in MuseLetter #155, March 2005, "Onward to Iran"), and that 
it will have devastating consequences for the region and for the 
world. He began by reminding the audience that there is no clear 
proof of an Iranian nuclear weapons program, and that what the US and 
Israel have pointed to as evidence falls short of what would be 
needed to publicly justify pre-emptive military action. The central 
question hanging over the proposals and counter-proposals involving 
the US, Iran, the UN Security Council, and other interested parties 
including Russia and China, is this: What if both the US and Iranian 
presidents seek confrontation and war? Sure enough, on August 1 the 
US was able to obtain a UN Security Council resolution giving Iran 30 
days to end its uranium enrichment program (otherwise permitted by 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)-which it seems unlikely to do. 
Events appear to have achieved a relentless, irrational momentum in a 
direction all too reminiscent of those in the weeks leading up to the 
2003 US invasion of Iraq.

Why would the US administration want confrontation with Iran? Perhaps 
that country represents an essential next step, following "regime 
change" in Iraq, in the project of remaking the Middle East. From a 
geopolitical point of view, Iran is located at the juncture of the 
Middle East and Central Asia. Not only are its own reserves of oil 
and gas considerable, but it controls access to the Persian Gulf. 
Iran is thus crucial to oil and gas transshipment routes to Europe, 
Japan, and the rest of the world.

Neoconservatives appear to believe that, as soon as the bombing 
commences, Iranians will rise up en masse to overthrow their 
humiliated rulers-just as they believed that the Iraqi people would 
welcome an American effort to completely reshape their country's 
economy and political system following the invasion.

Ward speculates that Mr. Bush may bomb before the November elections 
in order to preserve his Republican majority in Congress. However, 
the US military is already under enormous strain, and would be unable 
to deal with likely chain reactions following an air attack; and the 
likely response of the American people is difficult to gauge.

Why might the Iranian leaders want confrontation? Ward made the 
important point that the current Tehran regime is even less popular 
domestically than is its US counterpart among Americans. This is 
shown in the remarkable statistic that, according to a report by the 
Islamic Republic's Ministry of Culture and Guidance, less than two 
percent of the population attends Friday prayers regularly. 
Ahmadinejad, whose support comes almost entirely from the dwindling 
ranks of religious fundamentalists, is in power only because his 
opponent in the most recent election rendered himself utterly odious 
through blatant corruption.

Iranian hard-liners believe the US bombing will enrage and unite 
their people. Lacking a strong popular base, the Tehran regime has 
seized upon "nuclear nationalism" as a way of gaining legitimacy with 
the masses-just as Bush and company seized upon the issue of national 
security following 9/11.

Ahmadinejad and his cohorts evidently believe that, in the event of 
an American attack, the Iranian people will rally behind their 
government, thus injecting new life into the Islamic revolution. In 
confronting the US and Israel, the hard-liners also expect to be 
propelled to the forefront of the radical Muslim world.

Iranian exiles, who number roughly two million, generally loathe the 
current regime and look forward to its collapse, yet fear a conflict 
with the US, according to Ward. They say the bombing will not only 
leave the country in ruins, but will play into the hands of the 

In discussing the likely scope of the air campaign, Ward foresees a 
bombing lasting two weeks, targeting 1,000 sites including sea ports, 
missile defense systems, military bases, airports, industries, and 20 
nuclear facilities.

Iran's response is not hard to guess. The nation has hundreds of 
undeclared dock and port facilities along its Persian Gulf coast. The 
Iranian Navy recently conducted exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, in 
which a thousand small Iranian boats simulated attacks on American 
ships. The Strait is the world's only access point for millions of 
barrels per day of OPEC oil. The passage of tankers through this 
narrow waterway would almost certainly be interrupted for days, 
weeks, and perhaps months if hostilities erupted.

An attack on Tehran would also unleash an enormous backlash against 
the US in Shia areas of Iraq, possibly making the American presence 
in that country untenable. The Iranians' capabilities in this regard 
have not been lost on US military leaders. According to Ward, from 
American military leaders' perspective this is a mission from hell. 
The Pentagon brass are uncertain what targets to attack, because 
American and European intelligence agencies have found no specific 
evidence of clandestine activities or hidden facilities. Thus it 
would be virtually impossible to gain confirmation of the 
effectiveness of air strikes in eliminating Iran's nuclear program.

Recently, General Pace, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, apparently 
forced the White House to agree not to use nuclear weapons in its 
planned bombing campaign. This rebellion by the military has 
infuriated the White House.

Ward also provided a helpful perspective on the Shia-Sunni divide in 
Middle East. He noted that the bulk of oil reserves on the planet lie 
in Shia territory:

The Shia of Saudi Arabia would love to have the same control over 
their oil revenues as their Shia brothers in Iraq. Long oppressed by 
the Sunni Wahhabi rulers, these Shia go on pilgrimage to Iran and 
will react in subtle and overt ways if Iran is attacked. Bahrain is 
over 95% Shia and has experienced unrest before along the Shia/Sunni 
divide. Dubai is a large center of Persian-speakers and Iranian 
influence. Kuwait is also 30% Shia. In Aramco and KOC, the Shia 
vastly represent the local skilled labor force. An incident like the 
attempt on the Abqaiq collection stations by al-Qaeda operatives is 
not out of the question.

Ward pointed out that the Saudi and Jordanian monarchies speak openly 
of a radical "Shia crescent" across the Middle East, and that both 
ruling families would support a US strike against Iran. The 
Shia-dominated government of Iraq strikes fear in the hearts of Saudi 
leaders because they know it emboldens Shias in the Saudi oil-rich 
Eastern Province of al-Hassa.

It is the emergence of Iran as a regional power that is their 
principal concern, not Israel.

Southern Lebanon is Shia majority, and Syria's Bashar al-Assad is a 
member of the Alawite Shia sect. The alliance between Hezbollah and 
the Syrian regime is strong, and Iran has provided monetary and 
military assistance to Hezbollah for decades. Thus the current 
conflict in southern Lebanon carries a deep resonance across the 

Ward also notes: Many Sunnis view the US and Shia cooperation in Iraq 
as a conspiracy against them-a "Wahhabi containment policy." The 
profound conviction among much of the Arab world today, including the 
Saudi royal family, is that the U.S.

plans to do the same to Saudi Arabia that they have engineered in 
Iraq. Like Iraq, the theory goes, Saudi Arabia would be divided into 
three parts. The moderate Hashemites of Jordan would regain their 
historic control of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina; autonomous 
Saudi Shia would control the oil-laden Eastern Province; and the 
Wahhabis would be left baking in the sands of the Nejad Desert.

Thus the bombing of Iran could trigger wider chaos in the region, 
provoking not only temporary oil shortages and a global recession, 
but a wholesale reconfiguration of the Middle East in ways difficult 
to foresee.

Ward offered this helpful insider's view of Iranian politics: Iran's 
clerical regime includes three pragmatic factional power blocs 
willing to engage in an opening to the USA: Mehdi Karroubi, Mostapha 
Moin, and Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Leader of the unelected Guardian 
Council. They all continue to openly criticize the President, who is 
increasingly viewed as a loose cannon. His Messianic claims have 
proved more controversial in Iran itself than in the West. Among the 
President's critics, the "dealmaker" Rafsanjani may be a significant 
figure, for he represents the business class and the unelected 
clerics. These three factions, in contrast to Ahmedinejad, do not 
thrive on a siege mentality or on provoking a clash with the West.

When hostilities eventually ceased, negotiations between the US and 
Iran would necessarily ensue. Why not pursue them now and bypass the 
intervening catastrophe?

Ward discussed a recent Trilateral Commission Report-Is There a Plan 
B?-prepared for the plenary meeting of the Trilateral Commission in 
Tokyo, which recommended US-Iran negotiations with the goal of 
creating a Regional Middle East Nuclear Council, which would engage 
all countries with nuclear weaponry: The United States, Russia, 
Israel, Iran, China, India, Pakistan, Japan, the UK and France.  IAEA 
inspections would be accelerated, with open, transparent, 
unrestricted access in all countries. Israel would be provided with a 
comprehensive security package, and Iran would be offered explicit US 
security guarantees. Meanwhile the Middle East would be offered a 
modern Marshall Plan to provide Palestine, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, 
Turkey, Egypt and Algeria access to the WTO and World Bank funding. A 
regional Middle East Water Council would deal with the region's most 
valuable resource. Potential members would include Turkey, Syria, 
Lebanon, Iraq, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan. Finally, a Middle East 
Energy Council would deal with the region's other valuable 
resources-oil and gas. Regional pipelines, oil security, 
technology-sharing, and reservoir depletion and monitoring would all 
be discussed. Such a council would include Saudia Arabia, the United 
Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran. This plan has 
the potential to avert the looming conflict, but it is handicapped by 
conventional Western notions about the benefits of association with 
the World Bank and WTO.

Ward's presentation was remarkable for its depiction of Bush and 
Ahmadinejad as two sides of the same coin. Both need external 
conflict to maintain domestic legitimacy, and both are right-wing 
hard-liners supported by religious fundamentalists; they are also 
unpopular at home and habitually rely on bravado to boost their image.

There are those who maintain that a US attack on Iran is unlikely 
because the negative consequences for America would be severe and the 
benefits few or nonexistent. I recently made the acquaintance of an 
Air Force officer with a high-level security clearance who receives 
daily classified briefings; while being careful not to divulge secret 
information, he insisted that no bombing campaign is being seriously 
contemplated. I can only hope he's right.

Iraq: This Is What Collapse Looks Like

The war between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and the 
growing hostilities between the US and Iran are of course unfolding 
in the context of the failed US occupation of Iraq. There, ethnic 
conflicts are deepening, a de facto civil war rages, and a partition 
of the country seems likely if not inevitable.

Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani was recently forced to issue a 
fatwa denouncing the Israeli assault on southern Lebanon. Even the 
US-supported Iraqi president had to make statements critical of 
Israel while in Washington, embarrassing his official hosts. But any 
other attitude would have been unacceptable to his constituents. So 
far, the only thing to unite Baghdad's parliament-consisting of 
Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds-is condemnation of Israel and the call for a 

Fiery nationalist Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr, whose rising influence 
now rivals that of Sistani, said at a recent Friday sermon in Kufa, 
"I will continue defending my Shi'ite and Sunni brothers, and I tell 
them that if we unite, we will defeat Israel without the use of 
weapons." Were Muqtada's Mehdi Army to join with the few thousand 
Sunni Arab guerrillas currently bedeviling US troops, Iraq would 
quickly become untenable for the Americans.

Mr. Bush has repeatedly announced a "turning point" in the ongoing 
war-at the end of the invasion, with the capture of Saddam Hussein, 
with elections, with the formation of a government, and with the 
killing of reputed al Qaida leader al-Zarqawi. Now he has ordered an 
additional 5,000 troops to Baghdad to attempt to control the rapidly 
deteriorating situation there. This is not the sort of turning point 
he likes talking about.

A New Oil Regime in the Middle East?

There is considerable danger that the smoke and fire from these three 
geographic flashpoints-Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon-could converge in a 
larger regional conflagration. In light of all this potential for 
apocalyptic mayhem, a discussion of the oil business may seem almost 
frivolous. But it is important to remember that, historically, the 
drawing of borders in the Middle East; the establishment of British, 
French, and later US-backed puppet governments in these faux nations; 
and the rise of a radical Islamic fundamentalist movement to 
challenge the Western-backed regimes, have all been fueled by the 
wealth produced by oil, and by the need for oil on the part of 
importing countries.

For decades there was a petroleum status quo of sorts in the Middle 
East: the capacity for production exceeded demand, and OPEC worked to 
restrain exports in order to keep prices from collapsing; meanwhile 
big producers like Saudi Arabia served as the world's petroleum 
bankers, maintaining the solvency of the system. On only one 
occasion-the embargo of 1973-74-did the swing producers withhold 
needed oil flows for political reasons, or cause prices to reach 
levels unacceptable to consumers (the other major post-1970 oil 
shocks, due to wars or revolutions, were beyond OPEC's control).

Now the status quo is crumbling-not so much for political reasons 
(though those are certainly imaginable, given the situations outlined 
above), but for reasons of geology.

Questions about the real size of Kuwait's oil reserves have emerged 
in the Kuwaiti National Assembly, leading the opposition party to 
call for production cuts. Remarkably, Kuwait appears to be groping 
toward implementation of the Oil Depletion Protocol, without ever 
having heard of it. However, from the standpoint of nations that want 
to keep the oil flowing so the global industrial party can continue, 
this is bad news.

Even worse news, potentially, comes from Saudi Arabia, where oil 
flows have shrunk by some 400,000 barrels per day over the past few 
months, despite astronomic prices. No one knows for sure what is 
going on. The Saudis themselves say the production cuts are due to 
lack of demand, but this hardly seems plausible, unless the kingdom 
is only able to deliver unwanted heavy, sour crude to market-but even 
in that case, one would expect flows to increase, with a price 
discount factored in for resource quality.

At the same time, the Saudis are hiring just about every spare 
drilling rig in the world, resulting in a dramatically falling rig 
count in the Gulf of Mexico-a place that would otherwise be seeing an 
increasing count, given the fact that Mexico's giant Cantarell field 
is in now in steep decline, with dire implications for the nation's 

Matthew Simmons (Twilight in the Desert) has been insisting for the 
past few years that Saudi production is close to peak and that 
Ghawar, the world's biggest field, may be in decline. Now many others 
are speculating that this is the real reason for the falling 
production figures.

What happens next? It depends on the real condition of Ghawar. 
Perhaps a heroic drilling campaign could result in a temporary bloom 
in production, lasting perhaps three years, followed by a swift, 
terminal collapse. On the other hand, it is possible that the field 
has been so thoroughly exploited already that we are seeing the 
irreversible, rapid decline. At the ASPO conference a well-connected 
industry insider who wishes not to be directly quoted told me that 
his own sources inside Saudi Arabia insist that production from 
Ghawar is now down to less than three million barrels per day, and 
that the Saudis are maintaining total production at only slowly 
dwindling levels by producing other fields at maximum rates. This, if 
true, would be a bombshell: most estimates give production from 
Ghawar at 5.5 Mb/d.

Disturbing Trajectory

While these events in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are not front-page 
news, they are in their way every bit as significant as the ongoing 
violence in Iraq and Lebanon, and the ritualistic war dance of the 
American and Iranian leaders. The Israel and Lebanon situation seems 
to be about religion, terrorism, and land; the US-Iran situation 
seems to be about nuclear proliferation. But if one looks beneath the 
surface, nearly everything of significance that happens in the Middle 
East is at least partly about oil.

It may be pure coincidence that, just as the world's biggest oil 
producers are reaching a historic turning point signaling the end of 
the energy regime that has held since the end of US production 
dominance in 1970, a war has erupted between Israel and a militant 
organization supported by a nation the US plans to attack anyway in 
order to maintain dominance of world oil supplies going forward. 
History is full of such coincidences. But coincidence or not, it will 
be difficult to keep these unfolding realities from rebounding off 
one another, undermining attempts at a peaceful resolution.

Some commentators speculate that we are seeing the slow-motion 
commencement of World War III (or IV or V, depending on who's 
counting). I have no interest in fueling apocalyptic speculations. My 
strong wish is for a quick and peaceful resolution of the 
Israeli-Hezbollah-Lebanese conflict, a US stand-down from 
confrontation with Iran, and a speedy, voluntary US exit from Iraq.

In his talk at the ASPO conference, Terence Ward repeatedly said that 
America's bombing of Iran would make the work of petroleum depletion 
analysts easier-presumably because skyrocketing oil prices would 
force everyone to acknowledge that Peak Oil is a reality. On this 
point I disagree. If the scenario Ward outlined comes to pass, the 
public's attention will be fixated on military developments and 
casualties, with horrific news footage dominating nearly every moment 
of every television news broadcast. Oil prices will indeed soar and 
everyone will feel the economic pain from a crashing global 
economy-but few will look to geology as an explanation. Instead, they 
will point to the obvious proximate causes-attacks and counterattacks 
disrupting oil shipments, with speculators pushing prices even higher 
than they would otherwise go.

We have many reasons to hope that events are not spinning out of control.

Escaping the Matrix website
cyberjournal website  
subscribe cyberjournal list     mailto:•••@••.•••
Posting archives      
   cyberjournal forum 
   Achieving real democracy
   for readers of ETM 
   Community Empowerment
   Blogger made easy