cj#660> re: KulturKampf & spheres of influence


Richard Moore

Date: Sun, 13 Apr 1997
From: Charles <•••@••.•••>
To: "Richard K. Moore" <•••@••.•••>
Subject: Re: cj#656> China; Propaganda; Elite designs

You asked for my thoughts on how the Huntington KulturKampf scenario
dovetails with your apocalyptic vision of a war to humble a resurgent
China.  I think it is somewhat early to make hard assertions, but this is
how I see it:

Sam Huntington is drawing up a scenario for the first half of the next
century.  That scenario, as I understand it, envisions three major power
blocs (albeit defined as `cultures'): the Western, Islamic and East Asian.
Sam seems to assert that the interests of these blocs are bound to bring
them into serious competition, probably involving military conflicts of at
least the level of those that dotted the late (lamented?) Cold War: Korea,
Indochina and the numerous covert/proxy conflicts in Africa and Latin
America. (The Gulf War might be considered the first of the new-style
conflicts even though most of the Islamic nations were opposed to Iraq.)

The `Western' culture bloc would include the whole Western Hemisphere and
all of Europe (presumably including Russia if the current crop of
stumblebum statesmen manage to avoid permanently alienating their
potential ally as they are busy doing now.)  The Islamic bloc would
include most of the Islamic states, though the largest one, Indonesia,
may not fit easily into that box.  East Asia will clearly be China's
sphere of domination, but Japan may not accept that formulation and
could become a potential flashpoint of conflict.  Africa will be of
little consequence in power terms but India could be another area of
contention. It may surpass China in population within a few decades;
it fits easily into none of the three spheres nor (despite its size) is it
sufficiently powerful to constitute a block of its own.

Will the Western block, perhaps in alliance with Japan, seek to use
military force to bring China to heel?  That is certainly a possibilty,
one of which China is well aware.  (I first ran across mention of Sam
Huntington's KulturKampf scenario in the Beijing Review, an
English-language periodical I read in China last year.)
But it seems to me, Richard, that your two `paranoid visions' are in
partial conflict with each other. If transnational corporations are
making nation-states obsolete, then the power blocs may be less relevant
and less potent than Sam Huntington believes.
Of course, they will have us all slaving for coolie wages, but
they probably won't find it cost effective to incinerate us.

There.  Aren't you reassured?

  -   Charles   -


Dear Charles,

Your synopsis of Huntington is consistent with what I had read - thanks for
the elaboration and verification.  My thesis about the propaganda role of
Huntington's theory remains: elite planners do not want the anticipated
conflicts with China and Arab states to be seen as imperialist power games,
but rather as "defending Western civilization from heathen hordes", so to
        This is the oldest game in the book.  We saw it with "heathen
redskins" in nineteenth century US, and with the "White Man's Burden" in
the British Empire.  It wouldn't do for such episodes to be perceived as
simple aggrandizement.  As you point out, Huntington's cultural spheres are
really camoflaged power blocs.

I believe I've already dealt at length with the apparent contradiction
between globalization and national real-politic, but I can review if you
        The era of true globalization - where integration forces totally
replace great-power conflicts - will not begin until AFTER China and the
Arab states are brought into the fold.  My prediction is that this
bringing-into-the-fold will be achieved by the US continuing to enforce its
time-honored "strategic interests" vis a vis oil-producing regions and
Asian "balance of power".

Even under full globalization, it appears there will still be vestigal
great-powers, with vestigal spheres of influence.  The US sphere will
include, at a minimum, all the Americas - under the name of NAFTA and
carrying on the tradition of the Monroe Doctrine.  Germany seems to be
rapidly staking out its own "traditional" sphere of influence in Eastern
Europe and the Balkans (not to mention in Europe via the EU).  A
little-mentioned aspect of the Balkans conflict is that Croatia is a German
client state, with strong Nazi sentiments, and fought with Germany in WW
II.  The Balkan conflict was manipulated by the West so that Croatia gained
lots of territory at the expense of the Serbs (who fought against Germany
in WW II).  See also the message attached below.


Date: Sun, 24 Sep 1995
From: Butler Crittenden <•••@••.•••>
To: •••@••.•••
Subject: CENTRAL Germany

Richard, you know were Central Germany is, right? Here's an old scan I've
been intending to send that may add grist to your NWO mill. Take care,


Lost Empire May Be on Rise Again

Inhabitants of Central Europe unnerved by 'Germanization'

By Frank Viviano

Chronicle Staff Writer

[Mon., Jan. 17, 1994, p. 1, San Francisco Chronicle]

Malbork, Poland



        Perched imposingly above the Vistula River in the flatlands where
Lithuania, Poland and Russia intersect, the enormous red brick fortress of
Malbork has controlled Central Europe's vital access to the Baltic Sea
since the 13th century.

       But on the German train schedules that now direct thousands of
visitors here annually, the castle town is identified as "Marienburg," not
Malbork -- just as the area's two major port cities now appear as "Danzig,"
rather than Polish Gdansk, and "Konigsberg," rather than Russian

       For Germans, the renewed use of such long-abandoned names simply
acknowledges that this was for centuries the eastern limit of greater
Germany. For the region's present inhabitants, as Gdansk historian Lydia
Glinska puts it, "they sometimes seem the first worrying step toward the
reconstruction of a lost empire."

       In this and other unsettling instances, the lifting of the Iron
Curtain four years ago has set loose the barricaded floodwaters of Central
European history in a way that has exposed, once again, the ancient and
always disputed outlines of the old German empire.

       Until 1945, for instance, Malbork/Marienburg was the center of one
of Europe's oldest sources of nationalist tension, a conflict that some
observers fear is brewing anew as the post-Cold War era unfolds.

       Settled and militarized by the German Teutonic knights, the fortress
and the hinterland that surrounds it -- much of which comprised German East
Prussia, before it was handed over to Warsaw and Moscow after World War II
-- dominated the largely Slavic region for 700 years.

       It was the focal point of the "march to the east" that eventually
became a key vector in German foreign policy under Hitler.

Disputed German Connection

       Today, as Poles, Lithuanians and Russians struggle to modernize
their economies, the German connection is once again becoming an
indispensable, if controversial, element on the scene.

       The German legacy "is of immense psychological value in attracting
German capital and business development," said Klaus Blutner, a
Berlin-based investment consultant who has brokered several major joint
ventures in former East Prussia.

       "It must be remembered that this is not deep Russia or Poland,"
Blutner said. "It is closer to the West -- a part of the old Communist bloc
that again wants to belong to Western Europe, more than to Warsaw or

       In the Russian oblast of Kaliningrad, which covers most of old East
Prussia, Germans account for 90 percent of the total value of foreign

       "Every substantial new firm in the oblast is either a German-Russian
joint venture or purely German," said Oleg Mikhailov, deputy director of
western Russia's Jantar Free Economic Zone.



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