Globalization and the Revolutionary Imperative
Part II - Chapter 6 - preliminary
Copyright 1998 by Richard K. Moore
Last update 7 October 1998 - 4810 words
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Part II - Envisioning a livable world: common sense, not utopianism
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Chapter 6 - Collaborative internationalism: culture-diversity and the trap
of world government
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Prolog -- the importance of a national movement focus
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The current world system, the one being dismantled by globalization, is
based on the sovereignty of nation states. These nations have constitutions,
infrastructures, and some semblance of coherent civil societies. Given that
overcoming elite domination is an incredibly formidable task, it seems clear
that nations are the best level, the most advantageous scale, for popular
movements to take their stand against the global capitalist regime.
What are the alternatives? There are some who suggest aiming movement
strategy at establishing a benevolent world government, and others who
suggest aiming for devolution and regional autonomy. Both of these
approaches put popular movements in a weaker relative position, compared to
a national focus.
Some suggest that a benevolent world government could first be created and
then could impose peace, sustainability, and democracy on nations. This is
both utopian and counter-democratic. It is utopian, because there is no
basis of power for such a world government. While nations remain under the
control of capitalist oligarchies, there is no means by which a world
government can be magically created nor by which it could enforce its will.
And such a world-government approach is counter-democratic, because it is
centralist -- it is based on top-down central power instead of bottom-up
localism.
At the global level, furthermore, the problems of organizing are formidable.
The movement would face all the problems of organizing within nations, and
would in addition need to create a sound infrastructure for world government
-- all the time being actively opposed by the existing power structures.
Even if world government is the ultimate goal, it makes more sense to
establish functional democracies first in nations, and then to use that as a
base to establish a democratic world government.
In fact, the seductive appeal of benevolent centralism has been the bane of
democracy historically. For every problem, from civil rights to
environmentalism, the "solution" has typically been sought in assigning
greater power to central governments. Although there have been temporary
benefits, as with national civil-rights and environmental legislation in the
US in the sixties and seventies, the ultimate consequence has been further
concentration of centralist power in the hands of elite oligarchies. Any
attempt to strengthen the UN, or otherwise build world government under
current circumstances, is simply one more case of falling into the seductive
trap of benevolent centralism.
The approach of devolution and regional autonomy, although it does move in
the direction of democratic localism, suffers from a major strategic
disadvantage. It divides the movement into smaller, weaker units, that have
less hope of overcoming elite power. If Wales, for example, becomes
independent and tries to achieve autonomy from the globalist regime, it
would be in a much weaker position than would be Britain, in undertaking a
similar project. The smaller the unit of sovereignty, the less power it has
relative to the power of TNC's and the forces of globalization generally.
Until functional democracy is achieved, devolution and world government are
both premature endeavors for any movement that wants to achieve global
democracy and sustainability. Nations are existing fortresses, if you will,
that provide a potential power-base for democratic movements. The
world-government approach requires the creation of a new grand fortress in
the face of determined opposition, an impossible utopian task. The
devolution approach fails to take strategic advantage of the more formidable
national structures that already exist. Support for this argument can be
found in the fact that both devolution and world government are being
actively promoted by existing power establishments, while national
sovereignty is being rapidly dismantled.
In Part III we will look in greater detail at movement strategy, and the
relationship between national focus and international movement solidarity.
The point of this preview has been to argue that the soundest strategy for
overcoming capitalist hegemony is to begin by achieving functional democracy
within existing nation states, maintaining the continuity of existing
infrastructures and constitutions.
The United States, due to its overwhelming military power, is of pivotal
global importance in any attempt to achieve global democracy. As long as the
US remains in the control of the capitalist elite, democratic and
sustainable societies cannot be secure anywhere in the world, as is plain
from the long history of US expansionism and interventionism. On the other
hand, if democracy can be achieved in the US, in the heart of the beast as
it were, then it could be expected to follow rapidly in the West generally
and in much of the rest of the world as well.
It is the US which is the major proponent of globalization and laissez-faire
capitalism; if the US were to reverse its position the heart would be taken
out of global capitalism and it could not long survive. Furthermore, it is
the US that props up military dictatorships throughout the world; if US
support were to be withdrawn from such regimes, and diplomatic pressure
brought to bear instead for genuine democratic reforms, one could expect
most of these regimes to crumble as popular movements struggled to achieve
their own versions of locally-based democracy. In much of the Third World,
due to centuries of imperialist domination, democratic revolutionary
consciousness is much more advanced than in the West.
Societal boundaries -- issues regarding the scale of sovereignty
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So far in this investigation, the definition of "society", in a livable and
sustainable world, has been intentionally vague. There have been two
implicit assumptions. The first is that such societies may be somewhat
large, in that they must deal with the problem of harmonizing agendas across
many "localities". The second is that there would be more than a single
society, and that issues of inter-societal relations and trade must be dealt
with. The time has now come to justify these assumptions, and to be more
precise about the relationship between societies, as that term is being used
in this investigation, and today's nations.
Let us assume, based on the above considerations of movement strategy, that
functional democracy has been achieved within existing nations, and let us
look at the questions of sovereignty, devolution, and world government
within that context. If locally-based democracies are widely established,
there is a real possibility that changes in the boundaries of sovereignty
will be demanded by some localities and that such changes must be
accommodated if democracy is not to be sacrificed to centralist power. In
order to put the question of sovereignty in perspective, recall the
following two observations from previous chapters:
(From Chapter 4) -- Trade is one part of a society's wider
relationship with other societies, and a sustainable society -- a
society with sustainability awareness -- naturally approaches its
relationships with other societies from that perspective. For
example, if timber is needed as an ongoing import resource, then
the importing society would be eager for its trading partners to
employ sustainable forestry practices. Non-sustainability radiates
outward, destabilizing other societies. In a capitalist world,
there must be competition among societies in pursuit of relative
advantage; in a sustainable world, there is more likely to be
collaboration among societies in pursuit of mutual stability and
benefit.
(From Chapter 5) -- In today's democracies, people represent
localities, and society-wide policies are determined by the
dynamics of centralism and factionalism; in a functional
democracy, agendas represent localities, and society-wide agendas
are harmonized from those through the collaboration of delegates.
At the local level, a community agenda is harmonized from the
interests of all; at the central level, a societal agenda is
harmonized from the various local agendas, with the process
possibly repeated at intermediate levels. This is the meaning of
localism in the context of a functional democracy, and localism
eliminates the counter-democratic characteristics of centralism.
In a democratic, sustainable world, the primary organizing principle both
within societies and between societies is collaboration for mutual stability
and benefit. Societies, as a whole, endeavor to harmonize local interests
internally while at the same time they endeavor to work with other societies
to achieve harmonization of their various interests. The principles of
collaboration and harmonization arise necessarily from the requirements of
functional democracy and of sustainability.
There is a sense then in which the boundaries of societal sovereignty are
somewhat arbitrary in a livable and sustainable world. Whether Wales remains
with Britain, to use that example again, or whether it becomes fully
independent, the expectation would be that in either case collaboration and
harmonization of interests would prevail. Whether the entire globe is a
single sovereignty, or whether it is split into sovereign nations, a general
sense of global collaboration can be expected.
Wherever the boundaries of sovereignty might be drawn, the basis of
functional democracy is localism. Collaboration proceeds from the local
toward the central, through the harmonization of agendas. A sovereign
society can be seen as a locality within the larger global society, and
harmonization of global arrangements could be expected to proceed on a basis
not all that different from the harmonization that occurs within each
sovereign society. In each case, delegations bring agendas from localities
(at one level or another) to more centralized deliberations.
Nonetheless, sovereignty does make a difference. Within a sovereign society
there would presumably be greater cohesion and a more systematic
harmonization than would exist internationally. There are four specific
issues that have a clear bearing on modifying the boundaries of sovereignty
from those of today's nation states: cultural cohesion, the desirability of
self-sufficiency, the dangers of centralism, and the maintenance of world
order. World order will be discussed on its own below; the other three will
be discussed in this section.
I am not suggesting that we should ask political scientists or ecologists or
economists to figure out the "optimal" size and boundaries of nations; such
choices should and presumably would be made democratically. If people very
much want to be together, or to be apart, that can be expected to outweigh
considerations of economic convenience. I do suggest that if sovereign
boundaries are to be adjusted, these four issues will be of concern to any
society that desires to be democratic and sustainable.
Cultural cohesion : Peoples with a common language, ethnicity, religion, or
other shared cultural traditions, might desire to live within the same
sovereign society. The principle of democratic localism might lead to
adjustment of national boundaries in order to unite such groups, or it might
lead to devolution of nations into sovereign parts along cultural lines.
Self-sufficiency : If sovereignties are made too small, they are likely to
lack any semblance of self-sufficiency and to be over-dependent on trade for
their essential needs. This does not make small sovereignties completely
untenable, but it does detract from their long-term sustainability and
stability. The principle of self-sufficiency tends to mitigate against
excessive devolution.
Centralism : If sovereignties are made too large, then there must be many
layers in the decision-making process -- local interests become diluted,
democracy is endangered, and factionalism may lead to the usurpation of
power by power brokers and elites. The larger the sovereignty, the greater
the danger that centralist tendencies may creep into the political process.
The principle of localism, and the protection of robust democracy, tends to
suggest that some devolution, in the case of very large nations, would be a
good thing, and that world government, in particular, would endanger the
survival of democracy.
International order and the problem of hold-outs
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Based on the requirements of livability and sustainability, and assuming
that societies based on those principles can be somehow achieved, I have
argued that collaboration between sovereign nations could be expected to be
reasonably harmonious. As mentioned earlier, the example of Western Europe
provides considerable reason for optimism. Once a spirit of collaboration
was embraced, following WW2, centuries of bitter conflict and rivalry were
left behind, and the possibility of war between France and Germany, for
example, has become all but unthinkable.
But, even in a democratic world, the possibility of conflict between nations
cannot be ruled out. Intense hostilities currently exist between various
peoples and nations, and those could not be expected to instantly disappear
just because democratic governance has been established. Conflict might also
arise from such causes as contested borders or water rights, and
negotiations might not always succeed in finding a solution acceptable to
all parties. Or an ambitious faction might succeed in usurping power in some
nation, and launch a program of international competition and aggression.
If democracies are established widely, we can presume that one of their
first orders of business would be to take collaborative measures to reduce
the possibility of such future conflicts among nations. Quite likely the
United Nations would be seen as the appropriate venue for such collaborative
deliberations. In the revolutionary fervor of recently achieved democracies,
the UN could be expected to blossom in its effectiveness, with most nations
bringing to it a spirit of collaboration and hope for a livable world for
all. This is the spirit of democratic renaissance that the title of this
book refers to.
The task of these gathered nations would be to harness their fervor into
creating a framework for international relations that could be expected to
last, that would promote harmonious collaboration among nations, and that
could deal with those unfortunate conflicts that might arise between
nations, or for that matter, within nations. Since harmony depends on
democratic governance and sustainability, these principles would need to be
firmly incorporated in the framework.
If we can assume that the West, and particularly the United States, would be
fully in support of creating such a lasting and effective international
framework, the pressure, both psychological and otherwise, for the rest of
the world to cooperate in the endeavor would be very strong. Besides the
fact that cooperation would be in the self-interest of nearly everyone, the
prospect of being isolated from the global community would be highly
unattractive to any hold-outs, whatever their motivation.
But there might be some hold-outs nonetheless. In particular we must
consider the case of China. We cannot readily dismiss the possibility that
Chinese leaders might again successfully suppress a domestic democratic
movement, if another one were to arise, and that they might see their best
interests in maintaining a strong military and competitive national
ambitions. As we noted in Chapter 1, China has said that it considers itself
entitled to a special role, a kind of hegemony, in Asia generally. All in
all, China, based on its size and military power, might be an impediment to
establishing a stable, peaceful, international framework, and might be an
ongoing threat to global stability.
Smaller nations might be similarly inclined, in terms of retaining
competitive national ambitions, but they would presumably be easier to deal
with. Looking into the unfavorable China scenario gives us a worst case to
think about. If this case were in fact to develop, the rest of the world,
probably through the venue of the UN, would presumably focus much of its
attention on what to do about the China question. As long as China remained
uncooperative, general progress toward armaments reductions, elimination of
nuclear weapons, etc., could hardly proceed very far.
If China, or some other major-power hold-out, cannot be persuaded to become
a participant in a livable, sustainable world, and if its current centralist
government cannot be somehow replaced by a functional democracy, then global
stability will not be achieved. Armament levels would generally remain high,
in response to the threat of aggressive behavior by the hold-out, and the
forces of centralism and competitive nationalism might well re-emerge and
destabilize the initial gains of the democratic movement. One of the
requirements of a livable and sustainable world is that all major nations
achieve functional democracy and subscribe to collaborative internationalism
and the principles of sustainability. In what follows, we will assume that
this requirement has somehow been met -- otherwise our investigation ends
here in despair.
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[continued...]
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