(fwd) Pearl Harbor:The REAL History.Part I


Richard Moore

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Date: Mon, 21 May 2001 14:05:26 EDT
Subject: Pearl Harbor:The REAL History.Part I Mother Of All Conspiracies 
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Pearl Harbor: The REAL History - Mother Of All Conspiracies
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/pearl.html 5-20-1
"...everything that the Japanese were planning to do was
known to the United States..." ARMY BOARD, 1944 President
Roosevelt (FDR) provoked the attack, knew about it in
advance and covered up his failure to warn the Hawaiian
commanders. FDR needed the attack to sucker Hitler to
declare war, since the public and Congress were
overwhelmingly against entering the war in Europe. It was
his backdoor to war.

FDR blinded the commanders at Pearl Harbor and set them up
by - 1.denying intelligence to Hawaii (HI) 2.on Nov 27,
misleading the commanders into thinking negotiations with
Japan were continuing 3.having false information sent to HI
about the location of the Japanese carrier fleet.


1904 - The Japanese destroyed the Russian navy in a surprise
attack in undeclared war.

1932 - In The Grand Joint Army Navy Exercises the attacker,
Admiral Yarnell, attacked with 152 planes a half-hour before
dawn 40 miles NE of Kahuku Point and caught the defenders of
Pearl Harbor completely by surprise. It was a Sunday.

1938 - Admiral Ernst King led a carrier-born airstrike from
the USS Saratoga successfully against Pearl Harbor in
another exercise.

1940 - FDR ordered the fleet transferred from the West Coast
to its exposed position in Hawaii and ordered the fleet
remain stationed at Pearl Harbor over complaints by its
commander Admiral Richardson that there was inadequate
protection from air attack and no protection from torpedo
attack. Richardson felt so strongly that he twice disobeyed
orders to berth his fleet there and he raised the issue
personally with FDR in October and he was soon after
replaced. His successor, Admiral Kimmel, also brought up the
same issues with FDR in June 1941.

7 Oct 1940 - Navy IQ analyst McCollum wrote an 8 point memo
on how to force Japan into war with US. Beginning the next
day FDR began to put them into effect and all 8 were
eventually accomplished.

11 November 1940 - 21 aged British planes destroyed the
Italian fleet, including 3 battleships, at their homeport in
the harbor of Taranto in Southern Italy by using technically
innovative shallow-draft torpedoes.

11 February 1941 - FDR proposed sacrificing 6 cruisers and 2
carriers at Manila to get into war. Navy Chief Stark
objected: "I have previously opposed this and you have
concurred as to its unwisdom. Particularly do I recall your
remark in a previous conference when Mr. Hull suggested
(more forces to Manila) and the question arose as to getting
them out and your 100% reply, from my standpoint, was that
you might not mind losing one or two cruisers, but that you
did not want to take a chance on losing 5 or 6." (Charles

March 1941 - FDR sold munitions and convoyed them to
belligerents in Europe -- both acts of war and both
violations of international law -- the Lend-Lease Act.

23 Jun 1941 - Advisor Harold Ickes wrote FDR a memo the day
after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, "There might develop
from the embargoing of oil to Japan such a situation as
would make it not only possible but easy to get into this
war in an effective way. And if we should thus indirectly be
brought in, we would avoid the criticism that we had gone in
as an ally of communistic Russia." FDR was pleased with
Admiral Richmond Turner's report read July 22: "It is
generally believed that shutting off the American supply of
petroleum will lead promptly to the invasion of Netherland
East Indies...it seems certain she would also include
military action against the Philippine Islands, which would
immediately involve us in a Pacific war." On July 24 FDR
told the Volunteer Participation Committee, "If we had cut
off the oil off, they probably would have gone down to the
Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had war."
The next day FDR froze all Japanese assets in US cutting off
their main supply of oil and forcing them into war with the
US. Intelligence information was withheld from Hawaii from
this point forward.

14 August - After the Atlantic Conference, Churchill noted
the "astonishing depth of Roosevelt's intense desire for
war." Churchill cabled his cabinet "(FDR) obviously was very
determined that they should come in.".

18 October - diary entry by Secretary of Interior Harold
Ickes: "For a long time I have believed that our best
entrance into the war would be by way of Japan."


Purple Code - the top Japanese diplomatic machine cipher
which used automatic telephone switches to separately and
differently encipher each character sent. It was cracked by
the Army Signal Intelligence Service (331 men).

J-19 was the main Japanese diplomatic code book. This
columnar code was cracked.

JN-25 - The Japanese Fleet's Cryptographic System, a.k.a. 5
number code (Sample).
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/jn25b.gif JN stands
for Japanese Navy, introduced 1 June 1939. This was a very
simple old-type code book system used by the American Army
and Navy in 1898 and abandoned in 1917 because it was

Version A has a dictionary of 5,600 numbers, words and
phrases, each given as a five figure number. These were
super-enciphered by addition to random numbers contained in
a second code book. The dictionary was only changed once
before PH on Dec 1, 1940, to a slightly larger version B but
the random book was changed every 3 to 6 months- last on Aug
1. The Japanese blundered away the code when they introduced
JN25-B by continuing to use, for 2 months, random books that
had been previously solved by the Allies. That was the
equivalent of handing over the JN-25B codebook. It was
child's play for the Navy group OP-20-G (738 men whose
primary responsibility was Japanese naval codes) to
reconstruct the exposed dictionary. We recovered the whole
thing immediately - in 1994 the NSA published that JN-25B
was completely cracked in December 1940. In January 1941 the
US gave Britain two JN-25B code books with keys and
techniques for deciphering. The entire Pearl Harbor scheme
was laid out in this code.

The official US Navy statement on JN-25B is the NAVAL
J. Holtwick in June 1971 who quotes Captain Safford, the
chief of OP-20-G, on page 398: "By 1 December 1941 we had
the code solved to a readable extent."

Churchill wrote "From the end of 1940 the Americans had
pierced the vital Japanese ciphers, and were decoding large
numbers of their military and diplomatic telegrams."(GRAND
ALLIANCE p 598) Safford reported that during 1941 "The Navy
COMINT team did a thorough job on the Japanese Navy with no
help from the Army."(SRH-149) " ... many pattern messages
could be read practically entire with as few as 1500
meanings." (NSA).

In 1979 the NSA released 2,413 JN-25 orders of the 26,581
intercepted by US between Sept 1 and Dec 4, 1941. The NSA
says "We know now that they contained important details
concerning the existence, organization, objective, and even
the whereabouts of the Pearl Harbor Strike Force." (Parker p
21) Of the over thousand radio messages sent by Tokyo to the
attack fleet, only 20 are in the National Archives. All
messages to the attack fleet were sent several times, at
least one message was sent every odd hour of the day and
each had a special serial number. Starting in early November
1941 when the attack fleet assembled and started receiving
radio messages, OP-20-G stayed open 24 hours a day and the
"First Team" of codebreakers worked on JN-25. In November
and early December 1941, OP-20-G spent 85 percent of its
effort reading Japanese Navy traffic, 12 percent on Japanese
diplomatic traffic and 3 percent on German naval codes. FDR
was personally briefed twice a day on JN-25 traffic by his
aide, Captain John Beardell, and demanded to see the
original raw messages in English. The US Government refuses
to identify or declassify any pre-Dec 7, 1941 decrypts of
JN-25 on the basis of national security, a half-century
after the war.

AD or Administrative Code wrongly called Admiralty Code was
an old four character transposition code used for personnel
matters. No important messages were sent in this weak code.
Introduced Nov 1938, it was seldom used after Dec 1940.

Magic - http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/magic.html
the security designation given to all decoded Japanese
diplomatic messages. It's hard not to conclude with
historians like Charles Bateson that "Magic standing alone
points so irresistibly to the Pearl Harbor attack that it is
inconceivable anybody could have failed to forecast the
Japanese move." The NSA reached the same conclusion in 1955.

Ultra - the security designation for military codes. No
Pearl Harbor investigation discussed Ultra even though on
June 7, 1942 the Chicago Tribune and six other newspapers
betrayed the fact we were reading JN-25.


Warnings do no harm and might do inexpressible good 27
January 1941, Dr. Ricardo Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy in
Tokyo told Max Bishop, third secretary of the US embassy
that he had just learned from his intelligence sources that
there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor. This information was sent to the State Department
and Naval Intelligence and to Admiral Kimmel at Hawaii.

31 March 1941 - A Navy report by Bellinger and Martin
predicted that if Japan made war on the US, they would
strike Pearl Harbor without warning at dawn with aircraft
from a maximum of 6 carriers. For years Navy planners had
assumed that Japan, on the outbreak of war, would strike the
American fleet wherever it was. The fleet was the only
threat to Japan's plans. Logically, Japan couldn't engage in
any major operation with the American fleet on its flank.
The strategic options for the Japanese were not unlimited.

10 July - US Military Attache Smith-Hutton at Tokyo reported
Japanese Navy secretly practicing aircraft torpedo attacks
against capital ships in Ariake Bay. The bay closely
resembles Pearl Harbor. July - The US Military Attache in
Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were
constructing special small submarines for attacking the
American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program
then under way included towing them from Japan to positions
off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and

10 August 1941, the top British agent, code named
"Tricycle", Dusko Popov, told the FBI of the planned attack
on Pearl Harbor and that it would be soon. The FBI told him
that his information was "too precise, too complete to be
believed. The questionnaire plus the other information you
brought spell out in detail exactly where, when, how, and by
whom we are to be attacked. If anything, it sounds like a
trap." He also reported that a senior Japanese naval person
had gone to Taranto to collect all secret data on the attack
there and that it was of utmost importance to them. The info
was given to Naval IQ. Early in the Fall, Kilsoo Haan, an
agent for the Sino-Korean People's League, told Eric
Severeid of CBS that the Korean underground in Korea and
Japan had positive proof that the Japanese were going to
attack Pearl Harbor before Christmas. Among other things,
one Korean had actually seen the plans. In late October,
Haan finally convinced US Senator Guy Gillette that the
Japanese were planning to attack in December or January.
Gillette alerted the State Department, Army and Navy
Intelligence and FDR personally.

24 September 1941, the " bomb plot" message in J-19 code
from Japan Naval Intelligence to Japan' s consul general in
Honolulu requesting grid of exact locations of ships
pinpointed for the benefit of bombardiers and torpedo pilots
was deciphered. There was no reason to know the EXACT
location of ships in harbor, unless to attack them - it was
a dead giveaway. Chief of War Plans Turner and Chief of
Naval Operations Stark repeatedly kept it and warnings based
on it prepared by Safford and others from being passed to
Hawaii. The chief of Naval Intelligence Captain Kirk was
replaced because he insisted on warning HI. It was lack of
information like this that lead to the exoneration of the
Hawaii commanders and the blaming of Washington for
unpreparedness for the attack by the Army Board and Navy
Court. At no time did the Japanese ever ask for a similar
bomb plot for any other American military installation. Why
the Roosevelt administration allowed flagrant Japanese
spying on PH has never been explained, but they blocked 2
Congressional investigations in the fall of 1941 to allow it
to continue. The bomb plots were addressed to "Chief of 3rd
Bureau, Naval General Staff", marked Secret Intelligence
message, and given special serial numbers, so their
significance couldn't be missed. There were about 95 ships
in port. The text was:

"Strictly secret.

"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports
concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as

"1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly
into five subareas (We have no objections to your
abbreviating as much as you like.)

"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. "Area
B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford
Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island
from Area A.) "Area C. East Loch. "Area D. Middle Loch.
"Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.

"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would
like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so
important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks.
(Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would
like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two
or more vessels along side the same wharf.)"

Simple traffic analysis of the accelerated frequency of
messages from various Japanese consuls gave a another
identification of war preparations, from Aug-Dec there were
6 messages from Seattle, 18 from Panama, 55 from Manila and
68 from Hawaii.

Oct. - Soviet top spy Richard Sorge, the greatest spy in
history, informed Kremlin that Pearl Harbor would be
attacked within 60 days. Moscow informed him that this was
passed to the US. Interestingly, all references to Pearl
Harbor in the War Department's copy of Sorge's 32,000 word
confession to the Japanese were deleted. NY Daily News, 17
May 1951.

16 Oct. - FDR grossly humiliated Japan's Ambassador and
refused to meet with Premier Konoye to engineer the war
party, lead by General Tojo, into power in Japan.

1 Nov. - JN-25 Order to continue drills against anchored
capital ships to prepare to "ambush and completely destroy
the US enemy." The message included references to
armor-piercing bombs and 'near surface torpedoes.'

13 Nov. - The German Ambassador to US, Dr. Thomsen an
anti-Nazi, told OSS that Pearl Harbor would be attacked.

14 Nov. - Japanese Merchant Marine was alerted that wartime
recognition signals would be in effect Dec 1.

22 Nov. - Tokyo said to Ambassador Nomura in Washington
about extending the deadline for negotiations to November
29: "...this time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely
cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going
to happen." CIA Director Allen Dulles told people that US
was warned in mid-November that the Japanese Fleet had
sailed east past Tokyo Bay and was going to attack Pearl
Harbor. FOIA #F-1998-00977.

23 Nov. - JN25 order - "The first air attack has been set
for 0330 hours on X-day." (Tokyo time or 8 A.M. Honolulu

25 Nov. - British decrypted the Winds setup message sent
Nov. 19. The US decoded it Nov. 28. It was a J-19 Code
message that there would be an attack and that the signal
would come over Radio Tokyo as a weather report - rain
meaning war, east (Higashi) meaning US.

25 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary "FDR
stated that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as
next Monday." FDR asked: "the question was how we should
maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot
without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk
involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first
shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of
the American people it was desirable to make sure that the
Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain
no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors."

25 Nov. - Navy Department ordered all US trans-Pacific
shipping to take the southern route. PHH 12:317 ADM Turner
testified "We sent the traffic down to the Torres Straight,
so that the track of the Japanese task force would be clear
of any traffic." PHH 4:1942

25 Nov. - Yamamoto gave this order in JN-25: " (a) The task
force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining
close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance
into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening of
hostilities, shall attack the main force of the United
States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The raid
is planned for dawn on X-day -- exact date to be given by
later order. (b) Should the negotiations with the US prove
successful, the task force shall hold itself in readiness
forthwith to return and reassemble. (c) The task force will
move out of Hitokappu Wan on the morning of 26 November and
advance to the standing-by position on the afternoon of 4
December and speedily complete refueling." ( Order to sail -
scan from the PHA Congressional Hearings Report, vol 1 p
180, transcript p 437-8) This was decoded by the British on
November 25 and the Dutch on November 27. When it was
decoded by the US is a national secret, however, on November
26 Naval Intelligence reported the concentration of units of
the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive

26 Nov. 3 A.M. - Churchill sent an urgent secret message to
FDR, probably containing above message. This message caused
the greatest agitation in DC. Of Churchill's voluminous
correspondence with FDR, this is the only message that has
not been released (on the grounds that it would damage
national security). Stark testified that "On November 26
there was received specific evidence of the Japanese
intention to wage offensive war against Great Britain and
the United States." C.I.A. Director William Casey, who was
in the OSS in 1941, in his book THE SECRET WAR AGAINST
HITLER, p 7, wrote "The British had sent word that a
Japanese fleet was steaming east toward Hawaii." Washington,
in an order of Nov 26, ordered both US aircraft carriers,
the Enterprise and the Lexington out of Pearl Harbor "as
soon as possible". This order included stripping Pearl of 50
planes or 40 percent of its already inadequate fighter
protection. In response to Churchill's message, FDR secretly
cabled him that afternoon - "Negotiations off. Services
expect action within two weeks." Note that the only way FDR
could have linked negotiations with service action, let
alone have known the timing of the action, was if he had the
message to sail. In other words, the only service action
contingent on negotiations was Pearl Harbor.

26 Nov. - the "most fateful document " was Hull's ultimatum
that Japan must withdraw from Indochina and all China. FDR's
Ambassador to Japan called this "The document that touched
the button that started the war."

27 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson sent a confused and
confusing hostile action possible
http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/warnings.html or
DO-DON'T warning. The Navy Court found this message directed
attention away from Pearl Harbor, rather than toward it. One
purpose of the message was to mislead HI into believing
negotiations were continuing. The Army which could not do
recon was ordered to and the Navy which could was ordered
not to. The Army was ordered on sabotage alert, which
specifically precluded attention to outside threat. Navy
attention was misdirected 5000 miles from HI. DC repeated,
no less than three times as a direct instruction of the
President, "The US desires that Japan commit the first overt
act Period." It was unusual that FDR directed this warning,
a routine matter, to Hawaii which is proof that he knew
other warnings were not sent. A simple question--what
Japanese "overt act" was FDR expecting at Pearl Harbor? He
ordered sabotage prevented and subs couldn't enter, that
leaves air attack. The words "overt act" disclose FDR's
intent - not just that Japan be allowed to attack but that
they inflict damage on the fleet. This FDR order to allow a
Japanese attack was aid to the enemy - explicit treason.

29 Nov.- Hull sat in Layfayette Park across from the White
House with ace United Press reporter Joe Leib and showed him
a message stating that Pearl Harbor would be attacked on
December 7. This could well have been the Nov. 26 message
from Churchill. The New York Times in its 12/8/41 PH report
on page 13 under the headline "Attack Was Expected" stated
the US had known that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked
the week before. Perhaps Leib wasn't the only reporter Hull

29 Nov. - U.S. made a telephone intercept of an uncoded
plain-text Japanese conversation in which an Embassy
functionary (Kurusu) asked 'Tell me, what zero hour is.
Otherwise, I won't be able to carry on diplomacy.' The voice
from Tokyo (K. Yamamoto) said softly, 'Well then, I will
tell you. Zero hour is December 8 (Tokyo time, ie, December
7 US time) at Pearl Harbor'.

30 Nov. US Time (or 1 Dec. Tokyo time) - The Japanese fleet
was radioed this Imperial Naval Order (JN-25): "JAPAN, UNDER
AMERICA." ( Congress Appendix D, p 415). US ally China also
recovered it in plain text from a shot-down Japanese Army
plane near Canton that evening. This caused an emergency
Imperial Conference because they knew the Chinese would give
the information to GB and US. In a related J-19 message the
next day, the US translated elaborate instructions from
Japan dealing in precise detail with the method of
internment of American and British nationals in Asia "on the
outbreak of war with England and the United States"

1 Dec. - Office of Naval Intelligence, ONI, Twelfth Naval
District in San Francisco found the missing Japanese fleet
by correlating reports from the four wireless news services
and several shipping companies that they were getting
strange signals west of Hawaii. The Soviet Union also knew
the exact location of the Japanese fleet because they asked
the Japanese in advance to let one of their ships pass
(Layton p 261). This info was most likely given to them by
US because Sorge's spy ring was rolled up November 14. All
long-range PBY patrols from the Aleutians were ordered
stopped on Dec 6 to prevent contact.

1 Dec. - Foreign Minister Togo cabled Washington Ambassador
Nomura to continue negotiations "to prevent the U.S. from
becoming unduly suspicious."

1 Dec. - The tanker Shiriya, which had been added to the
Striking Force in an order intercepted Nov 14, radioed
"proceeding to a position 30.00 N, 154.20 E. Expect to
arrive at that point on 3 December." (near HI) The fact that
this message is in the National Archives destroys the myth
that the attack fleet maintained radio silence. They were
not ordered to (Order 820). Serial numbers prove that the
Striking Force sent over 663 radio messages between Nov 16
and Dec 7 or about 1 per hour. The NSA has not released any
raw intercepts because the headers would prove that the
Striking Force did not maintain radio silence. On Nov 29 the
Hiyei sent one message to the Commander of the 3rd fleet; on
Nov 30 the Akagi sent several messages to its tankers - see
page 474 of the Hewitt Report.
Stinnett in DAY OF DECEIT (p 209) found over 100 messages
from the Striking Force in the National Archives. All
Direction Finding reports from HI have been crudely cut out.
Reports from Dec 5 show messages sent from the Striking
Force picked up by Station Cast, P.I. From traffic analysis,
HI reported that the carrier force was at sea and in the

Richard K Moore
Wexford, Ireland

    A community will evolve only when
    the people control their means of communication.
    - Frantz Fanon

    "Consensus does not mean agreement.  It means we create a
    forum where all voices can be heard and we can think
    creatively rather than dualistically about how to reconcile
    our different needs and visions."
        - Starhawk, "Lessons from Seattle and Washington D.C.", 
        in "Democratizing the Global Economy", Kevin Danaher, ed.,
        Common Courage Press, Monroe, Maine, 2001.

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