Dear cj, Even here in Ireland (or the UK) it is not easy to understand what's going on behind-the-scenes in the peace process, nor to predict the outcome of that process - despite frequent 'in depth' reporting. Elsewhere the coverage is probably more spotty and is most likely spun for local consumption. A major breakthrough was announced this weekend, and this seems like a good time to say a few words about what's been going on, from this observer's perspective. The breakthrough illustrates the interplay of the three forces that have been shaping the the ongoing process - top-down pressure for a settlement from top Western leadership, the predictability of the reactionary Unionists, and the strategic astuteness of the IRA revolutionary movement. The breakthrough itself was a decision by IRA leadership to instruct its armed units to prepare for 'tactical decommisioning'. News reports were quite clear that this move would leave the IRA as strong as ever and as well organized as ever. The decommisioning is to be a token gesture only, a sign of goodwill to the Unionists. Nonetheless, the IRA decision was heralded as a 'seismic shift' in the negotiations, and subsequent reports are saying that Sinn Fein and the Unionists are close to agreement. The likely success of this strategic IRA initiative arises from its well-calculated timing. Pressure for settlement from top Western leadership - symbolized by the participation of a US trouble-shooter (Senator Mitchell) and the personal involvement of President Clinton - has been building for some time. The media (including Hollywood, with the likes of "In the Name of the Father") played its faithful role by translating the priorities of Western leadership into the arousal of public support for a settlement. It is this kind of pressure which led to the Good Friday Agreement, and it is such pressure which has brought about the recent and intense negotiating sessions. As of last week that pressure had reached a climax, and the IRA chose that perfect moment to put their apparently deal-clinching proposal on the table. Over the course of the recent negotiations, the reactionary Unionists had followed a strategy of delay. They refused to participate in meetings; they said they wouldn't sit with 'terrorists'; they issued divisive press reports - anything at all to stall and sabotage the peace process. Their behavior was clearly contrary to the letter and spirit of the Good Friday agreement - which they had signed. They came under increasing pressure from above to be more cooperative and forthcoming - to honor their agreements. One by one, in the course of the intense negotiations, the Unionist's sabotage tactics were taken from them. In the end their delaying strategy was whittled down to a single demand: visible decommisioning _prior to the creation of a Northern exectutive. In their reactionary desperation, the Unionists had allowed themselves to be backed out on a strategic limb. By making their move when they did, the IRA have chopped off that limb, leaving the Unionists with no apparent option but to live up to the Good Friday agreement. As the negotiations had been reaching a climax, most outside observers had assessed 'blame' equally. Both sides seemed equally unreasonable and intransigent. Toward the end, the IRA seemed perhaps the more stubborn - since a token de-commisioning would cost them little. The IRA, of course, had known all along that such a de-commissioning would be an easy token for them to toss into the bargaining game. They also knew, that once that token was played, the Unionists would seek some other pretext for delay. The elimination of paramilitary arsenals is a very emotional public issue, and the IRA deftly exploited this issue so as to move the peace process forward. By taking a stubborn position against prior decommissioning, the IRA was essentially setting out attractive bait for the Unionists. As the pressure for settlement mounted, the Unionists were enticed to take this bait - they hung their entire strategic defense on a point which was of only tactical significance to the IRA. What had _appeared to be unreasonable stubborness on the part of the IRA was in fact something quite different. It was the strategic exploitation of a Unionist vulnerability. Unionist stubborness, on the other hand, _was simply unreasonable - it reflected an implicit repudiation of the Good Friday Agreement. The IRA, as is typical of revolutionary movements, deployed creative tactics against a strategic regime vulnerability. The Unionists, as is typical of reactionary regimes, were limited in their responses by their own defensive mentality. In this way a revolutionary movement has a strategic advantage, and can sometimes prevail in the face a stronger adversary. The Good Friday Agreement, even if imperfect, represents a step forward for the people of Northern Ireland. Besides calling for the full decommissining of paramilitary weapons, the agreement establishes an executive which is broadly representative of the population. For decades the Unionists had been ruling as a majority tyrant, much as the White establishment had ruled over blacks in the American South. The "troubles" arose in fact out of a civil-rights movement - much like the American South was experiencing at about the same time. In the US, the reactionary regime blamed the trouble on "outside agitators". They were either lying or deceiving themselves. In Northern Ireland, the reactionary regime blamed the trouble on "IRA plots". They too were either lying or deceiving themselves. Although "outside agitators" didn't start the US civil-rights movement, they were in fact drawn in later - in the form of Freedom Riders and aroused Northern liberal voters. And although the IRA didn't foment the Northern Ireland civil-rights movement, they were drawn in to defend their communities from reactionary suppression. It soon became apparent that only a revolutinary movement against British-Ulster oppression could achieve civil rights, and thus the IRA gradually developed a stratetic revolutionary program. The Good Friday Agreement represents a victory for civil rights and for democratic representation. There is no reason why the IRA wouldn't view the agreement as a revolutionary victory - and in fact they have enforced its provisions within their organization to the best of their ability. Not only that, but they've played their cards shrewdly so as to maneuver the peace process around the obstacles laid down by Unionist bad faith and intransigience. Until very recently, Unionists have always made a point of referring to Sinn Fein and IRA as being one and the same. In fact, the IRA is an armed underground movement, and Sinn Fein is a legally established political party. Unionist and Sinn Fein leaders alike have been accused of past involvement in underground activities. But in both cases the decision to enter the political arena marks a decision to puruse peaceful means of resolving conflict. Sinn Fein and IRA both arise from the same community. Sinn Fein represents the hope that the community has in the democratic process, and its leaders are dedicated to that hope. The IRA represents those elements of the community that believe the Ulster-British regime understands only force, and that only force can compel them to grant the community full citizenship. The IRA perspective has perhaps been more realistic, given the suppressive behavior of the Ulster regime and the collaboration of that reigme with illegal Loyalist paramilitaries. Only outside pressure, as symbolized by Mitchell's involvment, has enabled the democratic process to become viable as a channel for significant change. Given that Sinn Fein and the IRA both share the same fundamental objectives - full citizenship for their community - it is no wonder that their independent strategies are in harmony. The IRA strategy reflects a military mentality - with a senstivity to strategic positioning, and the focused deployment, or withholding, of tactical forces. Sinn Fein, as the community's democratically elected delegates, represents the sentiments of all segments of the community, and has acted responsibly in taking a consistent, principled line in negotiations. Sinn Fein strove to achieve a win-win implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, and did its best to reduce divisiveness, both privately and publicly. Meanwhile the Unionists, as part of their sabotage tactics, intentionally spread divisiveness by making baseless and alarming public accusations against Sinn Fein sincerity and IRA intentions. If it were not for intense outside pressure, working in harmony with astute IRA strategy and consistent Sinn Fein diplomacy, the roadblock tactics of Unionist reaction could not have been overcome. Renewed civil war seems to have been avoided, despite the stubborness of the Unionists. imho, rkm ======================================================================== •••@••.••• a political discussion forum. crafted in Ireland by rkm (Richard K. Moore) To subscribe, send any message to •••@••.••• A public service of Citizens for a Democratic Renaissance •••@••.••• http://cyberjournal.org) **--> Non-commercial reposting is encouraged, but please include the sig up through this paragraph and retain any internal credits and copyright notices. Copyrighted materials are posted under "fair-use". 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