------------------------------------------------------------------------ From: Philip Sanchez <•••@••.•••> To: "'•••@••.•••'" <•••@••.•••> Subject: FW: China Date: Tue, 21 Jul 1998 Richard, What's your opinion? > -----Original Message----- > From: •••@••.••• > Sent: 21 July 1998 > To: •••@••.••• > Subject: China > > Global Intelligence Update > Red Alert > July 21, 1998 > > U.S. Contemplates Training Chinese Special Forces > > In response to a question at the routine U.S. Department of Defense > news briefing on Thursday, July 16, Defense Department spokesman Kenneth > Bacon confirmed that the U.S. may consider joint Special Forces training > with China. Bacon was asked to "comment on comments today by the commander > of the U.S. Special Forces Command that some future joint training with > China would be desirable... Is the Defense Department involved in promoting > any such future linkup?" Bacon responded, "In a broad sense, we're > looking at future military exchanges with China. I'm not aware of any > specific look right now at Special Forces operations, but that certainly > would be a type of military exchange we would consider. We have agreed > since 1996, December of '96, to explore new ways of improving cooperation > between the United States and China; new ways of getting our militaries > to work together more smoothly in training or other types of missions, > and we will continue." ---<snip>--- > _______________________________________________ > > To receive free daily Global Intelligence Updates > or Computer Security Alerts, sign up on the web at > http://www.stratfor.com/mail/, or send your name, > organization, position, mailing address, phone > number, and e-mail address to •••@••.••• > ___________________________________________________ > > STRATFOR Systems, Inc. > Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ > Email: •••@••.••• ------------- Dear Philip, I think one needs to look first at the big picture, the strategic relationship between the US and China, and between China and the corporate-globalist world system. China is on record as seeking a kind of hegemony in Asia, and the US is on record that such would be `unacceptable' to US interests. China is seeking to develop a "leap-frog" military capability, to cease being at the mercy, so to speak, of the US Pacific Fleet. The US, meanwhile, is rapidly developing a new generation of hi-tech war systems, of which Desert Storm can be considered prototypes. Both sides are preparing to play military hardball, if necessary, either to prevent or to enable a `greater China' sphere of interest. These geopolitical considerations are only relevant if China continues to maintain a strong sense of nationalism, a strong desire to chart their own national course. Most nations, under globalization, seem to have dropped any such desire. `Buying into' globalization seems to mean limiting ones national agenda to dealing with debt burdens and reduced budgets, seeking to attract corporate investment, and rushing to open the gates still further to corporate control. Will China `buy into' globalization in this sense? Will the seduction of the global economy and the power of the IMF force China to give up its unique national aspirations and become domesticated to globalization like the rest of the world? Or will it play its economic cards cooly, and benefit from trade without sacrificing its sovereignty? Will the US ultimately be forced to choose between tolerating a permanent `rebel Asian zone', on the one hand, and confronting China militarily, on the other? I haven't seen anyone claim to know the answers to these questions. People make arguments for both sides, but no one claims certainty. The US and China seem to be playing it both ways. They are each busily building their 'big sticks' and they are each pursuing `engagement', as we learn above in the Global Intelligence Update. Military relationships with other countries can serve US interests in many ways. In Chile, for example, during Allende's term in office, the US used its military ties to isolate Allende from the Chilean military, and to promote the coup. In Mexico, the US makes sure the local paramilitaries are properly trained and motivated to snuff out any local outbreaks of democracy, as in Chiapas. In Iraq, the long-term intelligence collaboration between the US and Iraq meant that the US had intimate knowledge of Iraq's military systems as it planned Desert Storm. In the case of China, military exchanges provide valuable intelligence, details about military systems, and factionalism, and political intrigues, that might be difficult to obtain in other ways. It opens a route to exert influence, or to promote factionalism. It may provide early warning of policy shifts. And it provides opportunties to recruit agents among the Chinese soldiers who are befriended, creating long-term intelligence `assets'. I hope these were the kinds of opinions you were looking for. all the best, rkm ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Wed, 22 Jul 1998 From: y To: "Richard K. Moore" <•••@••.•••> Subject: Re: u.s. v. china Are you confident that U.S. could now or will soon be able to "suppress all air defense measures" and "prevent China from launching strategic weapons"? If so, how,in view of their supposedly advanced (and U.S. supplied) missile technology? Is it possible that "no nuclear strikes tolerated on U.S. soil" is not a "mandatory objective"? -------------- Dear y, I think it is clear that the US _starts from a position of ultimate control. That is, the US could at the _current moment, if push came to shove, devastate China militarily, without suffering extensive collateral damage. One would anticipate some kind of first-strike scenario, including one of those `electronic warfare' space explosions that wipes out computer disks and communication systems, coordinated with strikes by cruise missles and stealth forces, and accompanied by selective use of tactical nukes, presumably clean enough to avoid global fallout. Is the US likely to permit China to swing the balance the other way, to where the US would be _unable to pull off a successful first strike offensive? If it did, then China would have achieved a protective umbrella, and the way would be open for regional hegemony. I don't think the US would so short sighted, and I think the rapid development of hi-tech weapon systems provide clear evidence of that fact, as do the strategic discussions in such establishment forums as Foreign Affairs. The US goes warily into China, let there be no doubt. If the US supplies Chinese weaponry, that provides both short and long-term benefits to the US. The arms-sales revenue is a start -- note that billions were made in the trade with Iraq that preceded the Gulf War. And then there's the detailed knowledge of the weapons' capabilities, and vulnerabilities. Modern warfare is increasingly hi-tech electronic warfare, and hi-tech stuff is subject to the `generation' phenomenon. You know what that is -- it's the fact that each new generation of home computer runs circles around the fastest of last year. It's the same in electronic warfare. If the US gives aways last season's model to China, you can be sure the Pentagon has something that can neutralize it, outfly it, or fool its radar into looking the wrong way. It's game of cat and mouse. There _is the risk that the mouse will transmute into a lion, that China could add a secret weapon of its own to the mix, and shift the balance unbeknownst to the US. But the US has long experience in such matters, having armed Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and modern Iraq, and so far it's always known how to come out on top in the end. It even managed the arms race with the Soviets in such a way that it was always in first place, while simultaneously bankrupting the Soviets into submission. One can only speculate what Pentagon strategists would count as `unacceptable collateral damage'. My guess is that they wouldn't be shy of permitting strikes against Japan or Taiwaan, for example. They might even contrive to encourage such strikes, so as to enable Uncle Sam to ride unrestrained to the rescue on his (stealth enabled) white horse. No sacrifice is too great from a US ally, as Russia, Europe, and China learned in WW 2. As for strikes against the US, I think they'd want to prevent those, and I imagine that's the basis of their strategic planning. But this is only my common-sense assessment. yours, rkm ------------------------------------------------------------------------ a political discussion forum - •••@••.••• To subscribe, send any message to •••@••.••• A public service of Citizens for a Democratic Renaissance (mailto:•••@••.••• http://cyberjournal.org) ---------------------------------------------------------- Non-commercial reposting is hereby approved, but please include the sig up through this paragraph and retain any internal credits and copyright notices. .--------------------------------------------------------- To see the index of the cj archives, send any message to: •••@••.••• To subscribe to our activists list, send any message to: •••@••.••• Help create the Movement for a Democratic Rensaissance ---------------------------------------------- crafted in Ireland by rkm ----------------------------------- A community will evolve only when the people control their means of communication. -- Frantz Fanon
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