cj#809> re: US-China strategy

1998-07-31

Richard Moore

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From: Philip Sanchez <•••@••.•••>
To: "'•••@••.•••'" <•••@••.•••>
Subject: FW: China
Date: Tue, 21 Jul 1998

Richard,

What's your opinion?

   > -----Original Message-----
  > From: •••@••.•••
 > Sent: 21 July 1998
> To:   •••@••.•••
> Subject:      China
>
> Global Intelligence Update
> Red Alert
> July 21, 1998
>
> U.S. Contemplates Training Chinese Special Forces
>
> In response to a question at the routine U.S. Department of Defense
> news briefing on Thursday, July 16, Defense Department spokesman Kenneth
> Bacon confirmed that the U.S. may consider joint Special Forces training
> with China.  Bacon was asked to "comment on comments today by the commander
> of the U.S. Special Forces Command that some future joint training with
> China would be desirable... Is the Defense Department involved in promoting
> any such future linkup?"  Bacon responded, "In a broad sense, we're
> looking at future military exchanges with China.  I'm not aware of any
> specific look right now at Special Forces operations, but that certainly
> would be a type of military exchange we would consider.  We have agreed
> since 1996, December of '96, to explore new ways of improving cooperation
> between the United States and China; new ways of getting our militaries
 > to work together more smoothly in training or other types of missions,
  > and we will continue."
---<snip>---

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-------------

Dear Philip,

I think one needs to look first at the big picture, the strategic
relationship between the US and China, and between China and the
corporate-globalist world system.

China is on record as seeking a kind of hegemony in Asia, and the US is on
record that such would be `unacceptable' to US interests.  China is seeking
to develop a "leap-frog" military capability, to cease being at the mercy,
so to speak, of the US Pacific Fleet.  The US, meanwhile, is rapidly
developing a new generation of hi-tech war systems, of which Desert Storm
can be considered prototypes.  Both sides are preparing to play military
hardball, if necessary, either to prevent or to enable a `greater China'
sphere of interest.

These geopolitical considerations are only relevant if China continues to
maintain a strong sense of nationalism, a strong desire to chart their own
national course.  Most nations, under globalization, seem to have dropped
any such desire.  `Buying into' globalization seems to mean limiting ones
national agenda to dealing with debt burdens and reduced budgets, seeking
to attract corporate investment, and rushing to open the gates still
further to corporate control.

Will China `buy into' globalization in this sense?   Will the seduction of
the global economy and the power of the IMF force China to give up its
unique national aspirations and become domesticated to globalization like
the rest of the world?  Or will it play its economic cards cooly, and
benefit from trade without sacrificing its sovereignty?  Will the US
ultimately be forced to choose between tolerating a permanent `rebel Asian
zone', on the one hand, and confronting China militarily, on the other?

I haven't seen anyone claim to know the answers to these questions.  People
make arguments for both sides, but no one claims certainty.  The US and
China seem to be playing it both ways.  They are each busily building their
'big sticks' and they are each pursuing `engagement', as we learn above in
the Global Intelligence Update.

Military relationships with other countries can serve US interests in many
ways.  In Chile, for example, during Allende's term in office, the US used
its military ties to isolate Allende from the Chilean military, and to
promote the coup.  In Mexico, the US makes sure the local paramilitaries
are properly trained and motivated to snuff out any local outbreaks of
democracy, as in Chiapas.  In Iraq, the long-term intelligence
collaboration between the US and Iraq meant that the US had intimate
knowledge of Iraq's military systems as it planned Desert Storm.

In the case of China, military exchanges provide valuable intelligence,
details about military systems, and factionalism, and political intrigues,
that might be difficult to obtain in other ways.  It opens a route to exert
influence, or to promote factionalism.  It may provide early warning of
policy shifts.  And it provides opportunties to recruit agents among the
Chinese soldiers who are befriended, creating long-term intelligence
`assets'.

I hope these were the kinds of opinions you were looking for.

all the best,
rkm

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 1998
From: y
To: "Richard K. Moore" <•••@••.•••>
Subject: Re: u.s. v. china

Are you confident that U.S. could now or will soon be able to "suppress all
air defense measures" and "prevent China from launching strategic weapons"?
If so, how,in view of their supposedly advanced (and U.S. supplied) missile
technology?  Is it possible that "no nuclear strikes tolerated on U.S. soil"
is not a "mandatory objective"?

--------------

Dear y,

I think it is clear that the US _starts from a position of ultimate
control.  That is, the US could at the _current moment, if push came to
shove, devastate China militarily, without suffering extensive collateral
damage.  One would anticipate some kind of first-strike scenario, including
one of those `electronic warfare' space explosions that wipes out computer
disks and communication systems, coordinated with strikes by cruise missles
and stealth forces, and accompanied by selective use of tactical nukes,
presumably clean enough to avoid global fallout.

Is the US likely to permit China to swing the balance the other way, to
where the US would be _unable to pull off a successful first strike
offensive?  If it did, then China would have achieved a protective
umbrella, and the way would be open for regional hegemony.  I don't think
the US would so short sighted, and I think the rapid development of hi-tech
weapon systems provide clear evidence of that fact, as do the strategic
discussions in such establishment forums as Foreign Affairs.

The US goes warily into China, let there be no doubt.  If the US supplies
Chinese weaponry, that provides both short and long-term benefits to the
US.  The arms-sales revenue is a start -- note that billions were made in
the trade with Iraq that preceded the Gulf War.  And then there's the
detailed knowledge of the weapons' capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

Modern warfare is increasingly hi-tech electronic warfare, and hi-tech
stuff is subject to the `generation' phenomenon.  You know what that is --
it's the fact that each new generation of home computer runs circles around
the fastest of last year.  It's the same in electronic warfare.  If the US
gives aways last season's model to China, you can be sure the Pentagon has
something that can neutralize it, outfly it, or fool its radar into looking
the wrong way.

It's game of cat and mouse.  There _is the risk that the mouse will
transmute into a lion, that China could add a secret weapon of its own to
the mix, and shift the balance unbeknownst to the US.  But the US has long
experience in such matters, having armed Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, and
modern Iraq, and so far it's always known how to come out on top in the
end.  It even managed the arms race with the Soviets in such a way that it
was always in first place, while simultaneously bankrupting the Soviets
into submission.

One can only speculate what Pentagon strategists would count as
`unacceptable collateral damage'.  My guess is that they wouldn't be shy of
permitting strikes against Japan or Taiwaan, for example.  They might even
contrive to encourage such strikes, so as to enable Uncle Sam to ride
unrestrained to the rescue on his (stealth enabled) white horse.  No
sacrifice is too great from a US ally, as Russia, Europe, and China learned
in WW 2.  As for strikes against the US, I think they'd want to prevent
those, and I imagine that's the basis of their strategic planning.  But
this is only my common-sense assessment.

yours,
rkm



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